Territorial inequality, equalization transfers and asymmetric sharing of non-renewable natural resources in Latin America
Non-renewable natural resources (NRNR) contribute a large share of tax revenue in Latin American countries; and the fact that these resources are concentrated in just a few regions generates a high level of territorial inequality. This paper aims to analyse how NRNR revenues could be included in equ...
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oai-11362-443682020-09-28T15:22:16Z Territorial inequality, equalization transfers and asymmetric sharing of non-renewable natural resources in Latin America Brosio, Giorgio Jiménez, Juan Pablo Ruelas, Ignacio Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo INGRESOS RECURSOS NATURALES IGUALDAD DISTRIBUCION DEL INGRESO DESARROLLO LOCAL DESIGUALDADES REGIONALES POLITICA FISCAL ADMINISTRACION FISCAL INCOME NATURAL RESOURCES EQUALITY INCOME DISTRIBUTION LOCAL DEVELOPMENT REGIONAL DISPARITIES FISCAL POLICY TAX ADMINISTRATION Non-renewable natural resources (NRNR) contribute a large share of tax revenue in Latin American countries; and the fact that these resources are concentrated in just a few regions generates a high level of territorial inequality. This paper aims to analyse how NRNR revenues could be included in equalization grants, and how countries are implementing adequate equalization grant systems, or could do so. Based on fiscal equalization theory, vertical and horizontal systems are evaluated with reference to mid-level governments in Argentina and Peru. The study identifies a variety of political and economic costs for different NRNR revenue systems, where: (i) the provinces own the resources in question (Argentina); and (ii) NRNR revenues are collected and distributed by central government to a large number of subnational governments under a fully asymmetrical scheme (Peru). Abstract .-- Introduction .-- I. Inter-jurisdictional equity principle and issues associated with equalization of natural resource revenue .-- II. Approaches to equalization transfers .-- III. Territorial inequality and fiscal disparities of NNRR in Latin America .-- IV. Equalization transfers: options for Latin America .-- V. Final remarks. 2018-12-31T14:18:21Z 2018-12-31T14:18:21Z 2018-12-30 Texto Documento Completo http://hdl.handle.net/11362/44368 LC/TS.2018/113 en Serie Macroeconomía del Desarrollo 197 .pdf application/pdf AMERICA LATINA LATIN AMERICA CEPAL |
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INGRESOS RECURSOS NATURALES IGUALDAD DISTRIBUCION DEL INGRESO DESARROLLO LOCAL DESIGUALDADES REGIONALES POLITICA FISCAL ADMINISTRACION FISCAL INCOME NATURAL RESOURCES EQUALITY INCOME DISTRIBUTION LOCAL DEVELOPMENT REGIONAL DISPARITIES FISCAL POLICY TAX ADMINISTRATION |
spellingShingle |
INGRESOS RECURSOS NATURALES IGUALDAD DISTRIBUCION DEL INGRESO DESARROLLO LOCAL DESIGUALDADES REGIONALES POLITICA FISCAL ADMINISTRACION FISCAL INCOME NATURAL RESOURCES EQUALITY INCOME DISTRIBUTION LOCAL DEVELOPMENT REGIONAL DISPARITIES FISCAL POLICY TAX ADMINISTRATION Brosio, Giorgio Jiménez, Juan Pablo Ruelas, Ignacio Territorial inequality, equalization transfers and asymmetric sharing of non-renewable natural resources in Latin America |
description |
Non-renewable natural resources (NRNR) contribute a large share of tax revenue in Latin American countries; and the fact that these resources are concentrated in just a few regions generates a high level of territorial inequality. This paper aims to analyse how NRNR revenues could be included in equalization grants, and how countries are implementing adequate equalization grant systems, or could do so. Based on fiscal equalization theory, vertical and horizontal systems are evaluated with reference to mid-level governments in Argentina and Peru. The study identifies a variety of political and economic costs for different NRNR revenue systems, where: (i) the provinces own the resources in question (Argentina); and (ii) NRNR revenues are collected and distributed by central government to a large number of subnational governments under a fully asymmetrical scheme (Peru). |
author2 |
Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo |
author_facet |
Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo Brosio, Giorgio Jiménez, Juan Pablo Ruelas, Ignacio |
format |
Texto |
author |
Brosio, Giorgio Jiménez, Juan Pablo Ruelas, Ignacio |
author_sort |
Brosio, Giorgio |
title |
Territorial inequality, equalization transfers and asymmetric sharing of non-renewable natural resources in Latin America |
title_short |
Territorial inequality, equalization transfers and asymmetric sharing of non-renewable natural resources in Latin America |
title_full |
Territorial inequality, equalization transfers and asymmetric sharing of non-renewable natural resources in Latin America |
title_fullStr |
Territorial inequality, equalization transfers and asymmetric sharing of non-renewable natural resources in Latin America |
title_full_unstemmed |
Territorial inequality, equalization transfers and asymmetric sharing of non-renewable natural resources in Latin America |
title_sort |
territorial inequality, equalization transfers and asymmetric sharing of non-renewable natural resources in latin america |
publisher |
CEPAL |
publishDate |
2018 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/11362/44368 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT brosiogiorgio territorialinequalityequalizationtransfersandasymmetricsharingofnonrenewablenaturalresourcesinlatinamerica AT jimenezjuanpablo territorialinequalityequalizationtransfersandasymmetricsharingofnonrenewablenaturalresourcesinlatinamerica AT ruelasignacio territorialinequalityequalizationtransfersandasymmetricsharingofnonrenewablenaturalresourcesinlatinamerica |
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1718441484171083776 |