Territorial inequality, equalization transfers and asymmetric sharing of non-renewable natural resources in Latin America

Non-renewable natural resources (NRNR) contribute a large share of tax revenue in Latin American countries; and the fact that these resources are concentrated in just a few regions generates a high level of territorial inequality. This paper aims to analyse how NRNR revenues could be included in equ...

Descripción completa

Guardado en:
Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Brosio, Giorgio, Jiménez, Juan Pablo, Ruelas, Ignacio
Otros Autores: Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo
Formato: Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: CEPAL 2018
Materias:
Acceso en línea:http://hdl.handle.net/11362/44368
Etiquetas: Agregar Etiqueta
Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!
id oai-11362-44368
record_format dspace
spelling oai-11362-443682020-09-28T15:22:16Z Territorial inequality, equalization transfers and asymmetric sharing of non-renewable natural resources in Latin America Brosio, Giorgio Jiménez, Juan Pablo Ruelas, Ignacio Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo INGRESOS RECURSOS NATURALES IGUALDAD DISTRIBUCION DEL INGRESO DESARROLLO LOCAL DESIGUALDADES REGIONALES POLITICA FISCAL ADMINISTRACION FISCAL INCOME NATURAL RESOURCES EQUALITY INCOME DISTRIBUTION LOCAL DEVELOPMENT REGIONAL DISPARITIES FISCAL POLICY TAX ADMINISTRATION Non-renewable natural resources (NRNR) contribute a large share of tax revenue in Latin American countries; and the fact that these resources are concentrated in just a few regions generates a high level of territorial inequality. This paper aims to analyse how NRNR revenues could be included in equalization grants, and how countries are implementing adequate equalization grant systems, or could do so. Based on fiscal equalization theory, vertical and horizontal systems are evaluated with reference to mid-level governments in Argentina and Peru. The study identifies a variety of political and economic costs for different NRNR revenue systems, where: (i) the provinces own the resources in question (Argentina); and (ii) NRNR revenues are collected and distributed by central government to a large number of subnational governments under a fully asymmetrical scheme (Peru). Abstract .-- Introduction .-- I. Inter-jurisdictional equity principle and issues associated with equalization of natural resource revenue .-- II. Approaches to equalization transfers .-- III. Territorial inequality and fiscal disparities of NNRR in Latin America .-- IV. Equalization transfers: options for Latin America .-- V. Final remarks. 2018-12-31T14:18:21Z 2018-12-31T14:18:21Z 2018-12-30 Texto Documento Completo http://hdl.handle.net/11362/44368 LC/TS.2018/113 en Serie Macroeconomía del Desarrollo 197 .pdf application/pdf AMERICA LATINA LATIN AMERICA CEPAL
institution Cepal
collection Cepal
language English
topic INGRESOS
RECURSOS NATURALES
IGUALDAD
DISTRIBUCION DEL INGRESO
DESARROLLO LOCAL
DESIGUALDADES REGIONALES
POLITICA FISCAL
ADMINISTRACION FISCAL
INCOME
NATURAL RESOURCES
EQUALITY
INCOME DISTRIBUTION
LOCAL DEVELOPMENT
REGIONAL DISPARITIES
FISCAL POLICY
TAX ADMINISTRATION
spellingShingle INGRESOS
RECURSOS NATURALES
IGUALDAD
DISTRIBUCION DEL INGRESO
DESARROLLO LOCAL
DESIGUALDADES REGIONALES
POLITICA FISCAL
ADMINISTRACION FISCAL
INCOME
NATURAL RESOURCES
EQUALITY
INCOME DISTRIBUTION
LOCAL DEVELOPMENT
REGIONAL DISPARITIES
FISCAL POLICY
TAX ADMINISTRATION
Brosio, Giorgio
Jiménez, Juan Pablo
Ruelas, Ignacio
Territorial inequality, equalization transfers and asymmetric sharing of non-renewable natural resources in Latin America
description Non-renewable natural resources (NRNR) contribute a large share of tax revenue in Latin American countries; and the fact that these resources are concentrated in just a few regions generates a high level of territorial inequality. This paper aims to analyse how NRNR revenues could be included in equalization grants, and how countries are implementing adequate equalization grant systems, or could do so. Based on fiscal equalization theory, vertical and horizontal systems are evaluated with reference to mid-level governments in Argentina and Peru. The study identifies a variety of political and economic costs for different NRNR revenue systems, where: (i) the provinces own the resources in question (Argentina); and (ii) NRNR revenues are collected and distributed by central government to a large number of subnational governments under a fully asymmetrical scheme (Peru).
author2 Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo
author_facet Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo
Brosio, Giorgio
Jiménez, Juan Pablo
Ruelas, Ignacio
format Texto
author Brosio, Giorgio
Jiménez, Juan Pablo
Ruelas, Ignacio
author_sort Brosio, Giorgio
title Territorial inequality, equalization transfers and asymmetric sharing of non-renewable natural resources in Latin America
title_short Territorial inequality, equalization transfers and asymmetric sharing of non-renewable natural resources in Latin America
title_full Territorial inequality, equalization transfers and asymmetric sharing of non-renewable natural resources in Latin America
title_fullStr Territorial inequality, equalization transfers and asymmetric sharing of non-renewable natural resources in Latin America
title_full_unstemmed Territorial inequality, equalization transfers and asymmetric sharing of non-renewable natural resources in Latin America
title_sort territorial inequality, equalization transfers and asymmetric sharing of non-renewable natural resources in latin america
publisher CEPAL
publishDate 2018
url http://hdl.handle.net/11362/44368
work_keys_str_mv AT brosiogiorgio territorialinequalityequalizationtransfersandasymmetricsharingofnonrenewablenaturalresourcesinlatinamerica
AT jimenezjuanpablo territorialinequalityequalizationtransfersandasymmetricsharingofnonrenewablenaturalresourcesinlatinamerica
AT ruelasignacio territorialinequalityequalizationtransfersandasymmetricsharingofnonrenewablenaturalresourcesinlatinamerica
_version_ 1718441484171083776