Institutional change and political conflict in a structuralist model

The article presents a theoretical model of political conflict and democratic stability in a small open developing economy, using as the basis a structuralist macroeconomic model. Political institutions are given in the medium run, but they vary in the long run as the result of political conflict be...

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Autores principales:	Porcile, Gabriel, Sánchez-Ancochea, Diego
Formato:	Texto
Lenguaje:	English
Publicado:	ECLAC 2020
Materias:	DESARROLLO ECONOMICO ASPECTOS ECONOMICOS ASPECTOS POLITICOS DEMOCRACIA EMPLEO CONDICIONES POLITICAS AJUSTE ESTRUCTURAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC ASPECTS POLITICAL ASPECTS DEMOCRACY EMPLOYMENT POLITICAL CONDITIONS STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
Acceso en línea:	http://hdl.handle.net/11362/45733
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spelling	oai-11362-457332020-07-02T01:49:01Z Institutional change and political conflict in a structuralist model Porcile, Gabriel Sánchez-Ancochea, Diego DESARROLLO ECONOMICO ASPECTOS ECONOMICOS ASPECTOS POLITICOS DEMOCRACIA EMPLEO CONDICIONES POLITICAS AJUSTE ESTRUCTURAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC ASPECTS POLITICAL ASPECTS DEMOCRACY EMPLOYMENT POLITICAL CONDITIONS STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT The article presents a theoretical model of political conflict and democratic stability in a small open developing economy, using as the basis a structuralist macroeconomic model. Political institutions are given in the medium run, but they vary in the long run as the result of political conflict between capitalists, formal workers, and informal workers excluded from the benefits of social protection conquered by the formal workers. The model suggests that a democratic breakdown is more likely the larger the informal sector, the lower the non-price competitiveness of the economy, and the weaker the country’s democratic traditions. Coups and democratization process can be both triggered by an external shock. The article claims that combining industrial and technological policies —which ease the balance-of-payments constraint— with the strengthening of social protection is key for the consolidation and stability of political democracy in developing economies. Abstract .-- Introduction .-- I. Conflicting claims in the labor market and external constraints: explaining the medium run equilibrium .-- II. Economic and political power and the stability of democracy: introducing institutional change in the structuralist model .-- III. A typology of political outcomes in the SMI when there is no structural change .-- IV. When politics go South: political instability and coups .-- V. Opening space for positive-sum games: the role of structural change .-- VI. Conclusion. 2020-07-01T16:53:05Z 2020-07-01T16:53:05Z 2020-07-01 Texto Documento Completo http://hdl.handle.net/11362/45733 LC/TS.2020/55 en Serie Desarrollo Productivo 224 .pdf application/pdf AMERICA LATINA Y EL CARIBE LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN ECLAC
institution	Cepal
collection	Cepal
language	English
topic	DESARROLLO ECONOMICO ASPECTOS ECONOMICOS ASPECTOS POLITICOS DEMOCRACIA EMPLEO CONDICIONES POLITICAS AJUSTE ESTRUCTURAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC ASPECTS POLITICAL ASPECTS DEMOCRACY EMPLOYMENT POLITICAL CONDITIONS STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
spellingShingle	DESARROLLO ECONOMICO ASPECTOS ECONOMICOS ASPECTOS POLITICOS DEMOCRACIA EMPLEO CONDICIONES POLITICAS AJUSTE ESTRUCTURAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC ASPECTS POLITICAL ASPECTS DEMOCRACY EMPLOYMENT POLITICAL CONDITIONS STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT Porcile, Gabriel Sánchez-Ancochea, Diego Institutional change and political conflict in a structuralist model
description	The article presents a theoretical model of political conflict and democratic stability in a small open developing economy, using as the basis a structuralist macroeconomic model. Political institutions are given in the medium run, but they vary in the long run as the result of political conflict between capitalists, formal workers, and informal workers excluded from the benefits of social protection conquered by the formal workers. The model suggests that a democratic breakdown is more likely the larger the informal sector, the lower the non-price competitiveness of the economy, and the weaker the country’s democratic traditions. Coups and democratization process can be both triggered by an external shock. The article claims that combining industrial and technological policies —which ease the balance-of-payments constraint— with the strengthening of social protection is key for the consolidation and stability of political democracy in developing economies.
format	Texto
author	Porcile, Gabriel Sánchez-Ancochea, Diego
author_facet	Porcile, Gabriel Sánchez-Ancochea, Diego
author_sort	Porcile, Gabriel
title	Institutional change and political conflict in a structuralist model
title_short	Institutional change and political conflict in a structuralist model
title_full	Institutional change and political conflict in a structuralist model
title_fullStr	Institutional change and political conflict in a structuralist model
title_full_unstemmed	Institutional change and political conflict in a structuralist model
title_sort	institutional change and political conflict in a structuralist model
publisher	ECLAC
publishDate	2020
url	http://hdl.handle.net/11362/45733
work_keys_str_mv	AT porcilegabriel institutionalchangeandpoliticalconflictinastructuralistmodel AT sanchezancocheadiego institutionalchangeandpoliticalconflictinastructuralistmodel
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Institutional change and political conflict in a structuralist model

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