Do depositors punish banks for bad behavior? market discipline, deposit insurance, and banking crises

Over the last two decades, both developed and developing countries have endured severe banking crises. The U.S. savings and loans (S&Ls) debacle in the 1980s, the chilean banking crisis in the 1980s, the Argentine and Mexsican crises in the mid-1980s and 1990s, as well as the recent financial tu...

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Autores principales:	Martínez-Peria, María Soledad, Schmukler, Sergio L.
Formato:	Artículo
Lenguaje:	eng
Publicado:	Banco Central de Chile 2019
Materias:	BANCOS CRISIS FINANCIERA CRISIS ECONÓMICA 1998
Acceso en línea:	https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12580/3640
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spelling	oai-20.500.12580-36402021-04-24T10:56:48Z Do depositors punish banks for bad behavior? market discipline, deposit insurance, and banking crises Martínez-Peria, María Soledad Schmukler, Sergio L. BANCOS CRISIS FINANCIERA CRISIS ECONÓMICA 1998 Over the last two decades, both developed and developing countries have endured severe banking crises. The U.S. savings and loans (S&Ls) debacle in the 1980s, the chilean banking crisis in the 1980s, the Argentine and Mexsican crises in the mid-1980s and 1990s, as well as the recent financial turmoil in Asia and Russia are only a few examples. At all times and, particularly, to avoid banking crises, regulators need to find ways to promote prudent behavior by banks, The standard recommendation is four countries to tighten supervision and prudential regulation. Alternatively, rather than depending exclusively on regulatory action, banking authorities can also increase their reliance on market discipline to oversee banks. 2019-11-01T00:01:36Z 2019-11-01T00:01:36Z 2002 Artículo 956-7421-072 https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12580/3640 eng Serieson Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies, no. 3 Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/cl/ .pdf Sección o Parte de un Documento p. 143-174 application/pdf Banco Central de Chile
institution	Banco Central
collection	Banco Central
language	eng
topic	BANCOS CRISIS FINANCIERA CRISIS ECONÓMICA 1998
spellingShingle	BANCOS CRISIS FINANCIERA CRISIS ECONÓMICA 1998 Martínez-Peria, María Soledad Schmukler, Sergio L. Do depositors punish banks for bad behavior? market discipline, deposit insurance, and banking crises
description	Over the last two decades, both developed and developing countries have endured severe banking crises. The U.S. savings and loans (S&Ls) debacle in the 1980s, the chilean banking crisis in the 1980s, the Argentine and Mexsican crises in the mid-1980s and 1990s, as well as the recent financial turmoil in Asia and Russia are only a few examples. At all times and, particularly, to avoid banking crises, regulators need to find ways to promote prudent behavior by banks, The standard recommendation is four countries to tighten supervision and prudential regulation. Alternatively, rather than depending exclusively on regulatory action, banking authorities can also increase their reliance on market discipline to oversee banks.
format	Artículo
author	Martínez-Peria, María Soledad Schmukler, Sergio L.
author_facet	Martínez-Peria, María Soledad Schmukler, Sergio L.
author_sort	Martínez-Peria, María Soledad
title	Do depositors punish banks for bad behavior? market discipline, deposit insurance, and banking crises
title_short	Do depositors punish banks for bad behavior? market discipline, deposit insurance, and banking crises
title_full	Do depositors punish banks for bad behavior? market discipline, deposit insurance, and banking crises
title_fullStr	Do depositors punish banks for bad behavior? market discipline, deposit insurance, and banking crises
title_full_unstemmed	Do depositors punish banks for bad behavior? market discipline, deposit insurance, and banking crises
title_sort	do depositors punish banks for bad behavior? market discipline, deposit insurance, and banking crises
publisher	Banco Central de Chile
publishDate	2019
url	https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12580/3640
work_keys_str_mv	AT martinezperiamariasoledad dodepositorspunishbanksforbadbehaviormarketdisciplinedepositinsuranceandbankingcrises AT schmuklersergiol dodepositorspunishbanksforbadbehaviormarketdisciplinedepositinsuranceandbankingcrises
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Do depositors punish banks for bad behavior? market discipline, deposit insurance, and banking crises

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