Market discipline and exuberant foreign borrowing
The debt crisis of the 1980s confirmed what most economists already knew well: the public sector cannot be trusted to make the rigth choices on behalf of society, especially in matters-such as foreign borrowing- whose ultimate costs may not be fully internalized by voters. The failure of the public...
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Autores principales: | Fernández-Arias, Eduardo, Lombardo, Davide |
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Formato: | Artículo |
Lenguaje: | eng |
Publicado: |
Banco Central de Chile
2019
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12580/3646 |
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