Policy biases when the monetary and fiscal authorities have different objectives

Until recently, the debate on the relationship between monetary and fiscal authorities centered on the inflationary consequences of mentary financing of the fiscal deficit. The moderately high inflation of the 1970s in some industrialized countries and, particularly, the recurring episodes of very h...

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Autores principales:	Bennett C., Herman, Loayza O., Norman
Formato:	Artículo
Lenguaje:	eng
Publicado:	Banco Central de Chile 2019
Materias:	POLÍTICA MONETARIA POLÍTICA FISCAL INFLACIÓN
Acceso en línea:	https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12580/3659
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spelling	oai-20.500.12580-36592021-04-24T10:58:37Z Policy biases when the monetary and fiscal authorities have different objectives Bennett C., Herman Loayza O., Norman POLÍTICA MONETARIA POLÍTICA FISCAL INFLACIÓN Until recently, the debate on the relationship between monetary and fiscal authorities centered on the inflationary consequences of mentary financing of the fiscal deficit. The moderately high inflation of the 1970s in some industrialized countries and, particularly, the recurring episodes of very high inflation in several developing countries seeking to avoid high and variable inflation has been to institute an independent monetary authority whose main mandate is the control of inflation. 2019-11-01T00:01:36Z 2019-11-01T00:01:36Z 2002 Artículo 956-7421-099 https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12580/3659 eng Serieson Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies, no. 4 Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/cl/ .pdf Sección o Parte de un Documento p. 299-330 application/pdf Banco Central de Chile
institution	Banco Mundial
collection	Banco Mundial
language	eng
topic	POLÍTICA MONETARIA POLÍTICA FISCAL INFLACIÓN
spellingShingle	POLÍTICA MONETARIA POLÍTICA FISCAL INFLACIÓN Bennett C., Herman Loayza O., Norman Policy biases when the monetary and fiscal authorities have different objectives
description	Until recently, the debate on the relationship between monetary and fiscal authorities centered on the inflationary consequences of mentary financing of the fiscal deficit. The moderately high inflation of the 1970s in some industrialized countries and, particularly, the recurring episodes of very high inflation in several developing countries seeking to avoid high and variable inflation has been to institute an independent monetary authority whose main mandate is the control of inflation.
format	Artículo
author	Bennett C., Herman Loayza O., Norman
author_facet	Bennett C., Herman Loayza O., Norman
author_sort	Bennett C., Herman
title	Policy biases when the monetary and fiscal authorities have different objectives
title_short	Policy biases when the monetary and fiscal authorities have different objectives
title_full	Policy biases when the monetary and fiscal authorities have different objectives
title_fullStr	Policy biases when the monetary and fiscal authorities have different objectives
title_full_unstemmed	Policy biases when the monetary and fiscal authorities have different objectives
title_sort	policy biases when the monetary and fiscal authorities have different objectives
publisher	Banco Central de Chile
publishDate	2019
url	https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12580/3659
work_keys_str_mv	AT bennettcherman policybiaseswhenthemonetaryandfiscalauthoritieshavedifferentobjectives AT loayzaonorman policybiaseswhenthemonetaryandfiscalauthoritieshavedifferentobjectives
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Policy biases when the monetary and fiscal authorities have different objectives

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