Transparency, flexibility, and inflation targeting

Three parallel and certainly not independent changes have occurred in central bank practices over the past fifteen years. The first is the spread of central bank independence, which is tied to the notion that even when the government plays a role in setting the goals of monetary policy, central bank...

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Autor principal:	Walsh, Carl E.
Formato:	Artículo
Lenguaje:	eng
Publicado:	Banco Central de Chile 2019
Materias:	INFLACIÓN BANCOS CENTRALES POLÍTICA MONETARIA
Acceso en línea:	https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12580/3723
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spelling	oai-20.500.12580-37232021-04-24T11:00:07Z Transparency, flexibility, and inflation targeting Walsh, Carl E. INFLACIÓN BANCOS CENTRALES POLÍTICA MONETARIA Three parallel and certainly not independent changes have occurred in central bank practices over the past fifteen years. The first is the spread of central bank independence, which is tied to the notion that even when the government plays a role in setting the goals of monetary policy, central banks should be free from political interference as they pursue those goals. A second trend is the adoption of inflation targeting. Beginning with New Zealand in December 1989, and followed by Chile in January 1991, over twenty countries have adopted some version of inflation targeting. Finally, the third trend among both inflation-targeting and non-targeting central banks is the adoption of greater transparency in the conduct of monetary policy. In fact, transparency is increasingly viewed as a standard and important component of best practices in central banking. 2019-11-01T00:03:34Z 2019-11-01T00:03:34Z 2007 Artículo 978-956-7421-28-2 https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12580/3723 eng Series on Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies, no. 11 Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/cl/ .pdf Sección o Parte de un Documento p. 227-263 application/pdf CHILE NUEVA ZELANDIA Banco Central de Chile
institution	Banco Central
collection	Banco Central
language	eng
topic	INFLACIÓN BANCOS CENTRALES POLÍTICA MONETARIA
spellingShingle	INFLACIÓN BANCOS CENTRALES POLÍTICA MONETARIA Walsh, Carl E. Transparency, flexibility, and inflation targeting
description	Three parallel and certainly not independent changes have occurred in central bank practices over the past fifteen years. The first is the spread of central bank independence, which is tied to the notion that even when the government plays a role in setting the goals of monetary policy, central banks should be free from political interference as they pursue those goals. A second trend is the adoption of inflation targeting. Beginning with New Zealand in December 1989, and followed by Chile in January 1991, over twenty countries have adopted some version of inflation targeting. Finally, the third trend among both inflation-targeting and non-targeting central banks is the adoption of greater transparency in the conduct of monetary policy. In fact, transparency is increasingly viewed as a standard and important component of best practices in central banking.
format	Artículo
author	Walsh, Carl E.
author_facet	Walsh, Carl E.
author_sort	Walsh, Carl E.
title	Transparency, flexibility, and inflation targeting
title_short	Transparency, flexibility, and inflation targeting
title_full	Transparency, flexibility, and inflation targeting
title_fullStr	Transparency, flexibility, and inflation targeting
title_full_unstemmed	Transparency, flexibility, and inflation targeting
title_sort	transparency, flexibility, and inflation targeting
publisher	Banco Central de Chile
publishDate	2019
url	https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12580/3723
work_keys_str_mv	AT walshcarle transparencyflexibilityandinflationtargeting
_version_	1718346844969369600

Transparency, flexibility, and inflation targeting

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