Leverage restrictions in a business cycle model: a comment

The paper by Christiano and Ikeda in this volume is one of the first efforts to quantify the welfare gains of leverage constraints in a macroeconomic model with a banking sector. Unlike other models their answer is that they can be even more desirable when banks hold little equity and intermediation...

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Autor principal: Bigio, Saki
Formato: Artículo
Lenguaje:eng
Publicado: Banco Central de Chile 2019
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Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12580/3807
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spelling oai-20.500.12580-38072021-04-24T11:08:24Z Leverage restrictions in a business cycle model: a comment Bigio, Saki CICLOS ECONÓMICOS BANCOS MERCADO FINANCIERO The paper by Christiano and Ikeda in this volume is one of the first efforts to quantify the welfare gains of leverage constraints in a macroeconomic model with a banking sector. Unlike other models their answer is that they can be even more desirable when banks hold little equity and intermediation is depressed. The paper stresses a static force that makes leverage constraints desirable from a second best perspective. This static consideration is the outcome of two frictions: The first is hidden effort on the side of bankers when choosing projects to fund. The second is the presence of incomplete contracts (in the form of limited liability) which prevents depositors from setting contracts that eliminate the hidden effort problem. As a consequence of the lack of optimal contracts times when banks have little equity will be times when optimal contracts cannot be signed and effort is inefficient. 2019-11-01T00:06:13Z 2019-11-01T00:06:13Z 2014 Artículo 978-956-7421-45-9 https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12580/3807 eng Series on Central Banking Analysis and Economic Policies no. 19 Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/cl/ .pdf Sección o Parte de un Documento p. 257-272 application/pdf Banco Central de Chile
institution Banco Central
collection Banco Central
language eng
topic CICLOS ECONÓMICOS
BANCOS
MERCADO FINANCIERO
spellingShingle CICLOS ECONÓMICOS
BANCOS
MERCADO FINANCIERO
Bigio, Saki
Leverage restrictions in a business cycle model: a comment
description The paper by Christiano and Ikeda in this volume is one of the first efforts to quantify the welfare gains of leverage constraints in a macroeconomic model with a banking sector. Unlike other models their answer is that they can be even more desirable when banks hold little equity and intermediation is depressed. The paper stresses a static force that makes leverage constraints desirable from a second best perspective. This static consideration is the outcome of two frictions: The first is hidden effort on the side of bankers when choosing projects to fund. The second is the presence of incomplete contracts (in the form of limited liability) which prevents depositors from setting contracts that eliminate the hidden effort problem. As a consequence of the lack of optimal contracts times when banks have little equity will be times when optimal contracts cannot be signed and effort is inefficient.
format Artículo
author Bigio, Saki
author_facet Bigio, Saki
author_sort Bigio, Saki
title Leverage restrictions in a business cycle model: a comment
title_short Leverage restrictions in a business cycle model: a comment
title_full Leverage restrictions in a business cycle model: a comment
title_fullStr Leverage restrictions in a business cycle model: a comment
title_full_unstemmed Leverage restrictions in a business cycle model: a comment
title_sort leverage restrictions in a business cycle model: a comment
publisher Banco Central de Chile
publishDate 2019
url https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12580/3807
work_keys_str_mv AT bigiosaki leveragerestrictionsinabusinesscyclemodelacomment
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