Central banking with many voices: the communications arms race

The job of central bankers is to use the monetary powers granted to them to promote price stability, sustainable growth, and a stable financial system. They do this in an environment fraught with unavoidable uncertainties. But, in conducting policy, there is one uncertainty that policymakers can and...

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Autores principales: Cecchetti, Stephen G., Schoenholtz, Kermit L.
Formato: Artículo
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Banco Central de Chile 2021
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Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12580/6135
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spelling oai-20.500.12580-61352021-10-19T15:06:30Z Central banking with many voices: the communications arms race Cecchetti, Stephen G. Schoenholtz, Kermit L. BANCOS CENTRALES COMUNICACIÓN POLITICA MONETARIA MERCADO FINANCIERO BANQUEROS CENTRALES The job of central bankers is to use the monetary powers granted to them to promote price stability, sustainable growth, and a stable financial system. They do this in an environment fraught with unavoidable uncertainties. But, in conducting policy, there is one uncertainty that policymakers can and should reduce: the uncertainty they themselves create. Everyone agrees that monetary policymakers should do their best to minimize the noise that their actions add to the environment. When policy is transparent and effective, people in the economy and financial markets respond to the data, not to the policymakers. During the past quarter-century, the evolution of an ever more detailed inflation-targeting framework facilitated a vast improvement in Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) communication. Over the same period, both the level and uncertainty of inflation have declined. We infer that since the mid-1990s, the U.S. economy has been reaping the benefits of a credible commitment to price stability, including a communications framework that reinforces that commitment. The job of central bankers is to use the monetary powers granted to them to promote price stability, sustainable growth, and a stable financial system. They do this in an environment fraught with unavoidable uncertainties. But, in conducting policy, there is one uncertainty that policymakers can and should reduce: the uncertainty they themselves create. Everyone agrees that monetary policymakers should do their best to minimize the noise that their actions add to the environment. When policy is transparent and effective, people in the economy and financial markets respond to the data, not to the policymakers. During the past quarter-century, the evolution of an ever more detailed inflation-targeting framework facilitated a vast improvement in Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) communication. Over the same period, both the level and uncertainty of inflation have declined. We infer that since the mid-1990s, the U.S. economy has been reaping the benefits of a credible commitment to price stability, including a communications framework that reinforces that commitment. 2021-10-19T14:54:06Z 2021-10-19T14:54:06Z 2021-10 Artículo 978-956-7421-69-5 978-956-7421-70-1 (pdf) 0717-6686 https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12580/6135 en Series on Central Banking Analysis and Economic Policies; no. 28 Serie Banca Central, análisis y políticas económicas; no. 28 Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/cl/ .pdf Sección o Parte de un Documento p. 343-412 application/pdf Banco Central de Chile
institution Banco Central
collection Banco Central
language English
topic BANCOS CENTRALES
COMUNICACIÓN
POLITICA MONETARIA
MERCADO FINANCIERO
BANQUEROS CENTRALES
spellingShingle BANCOS CENTRALES
COMUNICACIÓN
POLITICA MONETARIA
MERCADO FINANCIERO
BANQUEROS CENTRALES
Cecchetti, Stephen G.
Schoenholtz, Kermit L.
Central banking with many voices: the communications arms race
description The job of central bankers is to use the monetary powers granted to them to promote price stability, sustainable growth, and a stable financial system. They do this in an environment fraught with unavoidable uncertainties. But, in conducting policy, there is one uncertainty that policymakers can and should reduce: the uncertainty they themselves create. Everyone agrees that monetary policymakers should do their best to minimize the noise that their actions add to the environment. When policy is transparent and effective, people in the economy and financial markets respond to the data, not to the policymakers. During the past quarter-century, the evolution of an ever more detailed inflation-targeting framework facilitated a vast improvement in Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) communication. Over the same period, both the level and uncertainty of inflation have declined. We infer that since the mid-1990s, the U.S. economy has been reaping the benefits of a credible commitment to price stability, including a communications framework that reinforces that commitment.
format Artículo
author Cecchetti, Stephen G.
Schoenholtz, Kermit L.
author_facet Cecchetti, Stephen G.
Schoenholtz, Kermit L.
author_sort Cecchetti, Stephen G.
title Central banking with many voices: the communications arms race
title_short Central banking with many voices: the communications arms race
title_full Central banking with many voices: the communications arms race
title_fullStr Central banking with many voices: the communications arms race
title_full_unstemmed Central banking with many voices: the communications arms race
title_sort central banking with many voices: the communications arms race
publisher Banco Central de Chile
publishDate 2021
url https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12580/6135
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