Central banking with many voices: the communications arms race
Around the world, most central banks set policy by committee. This is motivated in part by the idea that groups reach better decisions than individuals and in part by a desire for representation of different geographical areas and economic constituencies in policymaking. The Bank for International S...
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2021
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oai-20.500.12580-61372021-10-19T16:01:20Z Central banking with many voices: the communications arms race Vissing-Jorgensen, Annette BANCOS CENTRALES COMUNICACIÓN Around the world, most central banks set policy by committee. This is motivated in part by the idea that groups reach better decisions than individuals and in part by a desire for representation of different geographical areas and economic constituencies in policymaking. The Bank for International Settlements (2009) documents that across central banks, the median number of members on monetary policy boards is eight. The Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank (ECB) have substantially more decision-makers than the median, with 19 members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) (of which 12 vote at any given time) and 25 members of the ECB’s Governing Council (of which 21 vote at any given time). Around the world, most central banks set policy by committee. This is motivated in part by the idea that groups reach better decisions than individuals and in part by a desire for representation of different geographical areas and economic constituencies in policymaking. The Bank for International Settlements (2009) documents that across central banks, the median number of members on monetary policy boards is eight. The Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank (ECB) have substantially more decision-makers than the median, with 19 members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) (of which 12 vote at any given time) and 25 members of the ECB’s Governing Council (of which 21 vote at any given time). 2021-10-19T15:41:48Z 2021-10-19T15:41:48Z 2021-10 Artículo 978-956-7421-69-5 978-956-7421-70-1 (pdf) 0717-6686 https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12580/6137 en Series on Central Banking Analysis and Economic Policies; no. 28 Serie Banca Central, análisis y políticas económicas; no. 28 Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/cl/ .pdf Sección o Parte de un Documento p. 229-278 application/pdf Banco Central de Chile |
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Banco Central |
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Banco Central |
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English |
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BANCOS CENTRALES COMUNICACIÓN |
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BANCOS CENTRALES COMUNICACIÓN Vissing-Jorgensen, Annette Central banking with many voices: the communications arms race |
description |
Around the world, most central banks set policy by committee. This is motivated in part by the idea that groups reach better decisions than individuals and in part by a desire for representation of different geographical areas and economic constituencies in policymaking. The Bank for International Settlements (2009) documents that across central banks, the median number of members on monetary policy boards is eight. The Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank (ECB) have substantially more decision-makers than the median, with 19 members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) (of which 12 vote at any given time) and 25 members of the ECB’s Governing Council (of which 21 vote at any given time). |
format |
Artículo |
author |
Vissing-Jorgensen, Annette |
author_facet |
Vissing-Jorgensen, Annette |
author_sort |
Vissing-Jorgensen, Annette |
title |
Central banking with many voices: the communications arms race |
title_short |
Central banking with many voices: the communications arms race |
title_full |
Central banking with many voices: the communications arms race |
title_fullStr |
Central banking with many voices: the communications arms race |
title_full_unstemmed |
Central banking with many voices: the communications arms race |
title_sort |
central banking with many voices: the communications arms race |
publisher |
Banco Central de Chile |
publishDate |
2021 |
url |
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12580/6137 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT vissingjorgensenannette centralbankingwithmanyvoicesthecommunicationsarmsrace |
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