Inflation targeting under political pressure

Inflation targeting under political pressure

Historically, many emerging economies, particularly in Latin America, battled against persistently high and volatile inflation. Today, emerging economies continue to experience higher inflation than developed ones, and their central banks deviate more frequently from inflation targets. These pattern...

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Autores principales: Halac, Marina, Yared, Pierre
Formato: Artículo
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Banco Central de Chile 2021
Materias:
INFLACIÓN
POLÍTICA MONETARIA
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12580/6140
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spelling oai-20.500.12580-61402021-10-19T16:32:07Z Inflation targeting under political pressure Halac, Marina Yared, Pierre INFLACIÓN POLÍTICA MONETARIA Historically, many emerging economies, particularly in Latin America, battled against persistently high and volatile inflation. Today, emerging economies continue to experience higher inflation than developed ones, and their central banks deviate more frequently from inflation targets. These patterns partly reflect the added political pressure and a lower degree of independence faced by central banks in emerging markets. For example, Aisen and Veiga (2006, 2008) find that inflation is higher and more volatile in countries with a lower quality of political institutions and a higher degree of political instability. By using a narrative approach, Binder (2018) finds that, on average, ten percent of central banks face political pressure and that this pressure is associated with higher inflation and inflation persistence. Historically, many emerging economies, particularly in Latin America, battled against persistently high and volatile inflation. Today, emerging economies continue to experience higher inflation than developed ones, and their central banks deviate more frequently from inflation targets. These patterns partly reflect the added political pressure and a lower degree of independence faced by central banks in emerging markets. For example, Aisen and Veiga (2006, 2008) find that inflation is higher and more volatile in countries with a lower quality of political institutions and a higher degree of political instability. By using a narrative approach, Binder (2018) finds that, on average, ten percent of central banks face political pressure and that this pressure is associated with higher inflation and inflation persistence. 2021-10-19T16:29:31Z 2021-10-19T16:29:31Z 2021-10 Artículo 978-956-7421-69-5 978-956-7421-70-1 (pdf) 0717-6686 https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12580/6140 en Series on Central Banking Analysis and Economic Policies; no. 28 Serie Banca Central, análisis y políticas económicas; no. 28 Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/cl/ .pdf Sección o Parte de un Documento p. 123-144 application/pdf Banco Central de Chile
institution Banco Central
collection Banco Central
language English
topic INFLACIÓN
POLÍTICA MONETARIA
spellingShingle INFLACIÓN
POLÍTICA MONETARIA
Halac, Marina
Yared, Pierre
Inflation targeting under political pressure
description Historically, many emerging economies, particularly in Latin America, battled against persistently high and volatile inflation. Today, emerging economies continue to experience higher inflation than developed ones, and their central banks deviate more frequently from inflation targets. These patterns partly reflect the added political pressure and a lower degree of independence faced by central banks in emerging markets. For example, Aisen and Veiga (2006, 2008) find that inflation is higher and more volatile in countries with a lower quality of political institutions and a higher degree of political instability. By using a narrative approach, Binder (2018) finds that, on average, ten percent of central banks face political pressure and that this pressure is associated with higher inflation and inflation persistence.
format Artículo
author Halac, Marina
Yared, Pierre
author_facet Halac, Marina
Yared, Pierre
author_sort Halac, Marina
title Inflation targeting under political pressure
title_short Inflation targeting under political pressure
title_full Inflation targeting under political pressure
title_fullStr Inflation targeting under political pressure
title_full_unstemmed Inflation targeting under political pressure
title_sort inflation targeting under political pressure
publisher Banco Central de Chile
publishDate 2021
url https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12580/6140
work_keys_str_mv AT halacmarina inflationtargetingunderpoliticalpressure
AT yaredpierre inflationtargetingunderpoliticalpressure
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