Public trust and central banking

Public trust and central banking

Central bank independence is one of the most remarkable pieces of institutional architecture fostered by economic thinking in the last half century. Theoretical studies in the 1980s stressed central bank independence as a precondition to bringing inflation under lasting control, and support for refo...

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Autor principal: Marcel Cullel, Mario
Formato: Artículo
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Banco Central de Chile 2021
Materias:
BANCOS CENTRALES
FIDEICOMISO
INFLACIÓN
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12580/6143
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spelling oai-20.500.12580-61432021-10-19T18:31:18Z Public trust and central banking Marcel Cullel, Mario BANCOS CENTRALES FIDEICOMISO INFLACIÓN Central bank independence is one of the most remarkable pieces of institutional architecture fostered by economic thinking in the last half century. Theoretical studies in the 1980s stressed central bank independence as a precondition to bringing inflation under lasting control, and support for reform soon spread from academia to policymaking. Professor Kenneth Rogoff was a major contributor to this process, so we are privileged to have him as keynote speaker at this Conference. Central bank independence delivered upon expectations. As the countries with independent central banks grew to nearly 70 in recent years, average world inflation dropped to 4%, from more than 25% 30 years ago. Empirical studies are pretty conclusive on a strong correlation between central bank independence and low and stable inflation after controlling for other variables. Central bank independence is one of the most remarkable pieces of institutional architecture fostered by economic thinking in the last half century. Theoretical studies in the 1980s stressed central bank independence as a precondition to bringing inflation under lasting control, and support for reform soon spread from academia to policymaking. Professor Kenneth Rogoff was a major contributor to this process, so we are privileged to have him as keynote speaker at this Conference. Central bank independence delivered upon expectations. As the countries with independent central banks grew to nearly 70 in recent years, average world inflation dropped to 4%, from more than 25% 30 years ago. Empirical studies are pretty conclusive on a strong correlation between central bank independence and low and stable inflation after controlling for other variables. 2021-10-19T18:15:33Z 2021-10-19T18:15:33Z 2021-10 Artículo 978-956-7421-69-5 978-956-7421-70-1 (pdf) 0717-6686 https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12580/6143 en Series on Central Banking Analysis and Economic Policies; no. 28 Serie Banca Central, análisis y políticas económicas; no. 28 Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/cl/ .pdf Sección o Parte de un Documento p. 15-26 application/pdf Banco Central de Chile
institution Banco Central
collection Banco Central
language English
topic BANCOS CENTRALES
FIDEICOMISO
INFLACIÓN
spellingShingle BANCOS CENTRALES
FIDEICOMISO
INFLACIÓN
Marcel Cullel, Mario
Public trust and central banking
description Central bank independence is one of the most remarkable pieces of institutional architecture fostered by economic thinking in the last half century. Theoretical studies in the 1980s stressed central bank independence as a precondition to bringing inflation under lasting control, and support for reform soon spread from academia to policymaking. Professor Kenneth Rogoff was a major contributor to this process, so we are privileged to have him as keynote speaker at this Conference. Central bank independence delivered upon expectations. As the countries with independent central banks grew to nearly 70 in recent years, average world inflation dropped to 4%, from more than 25% 30 years ago. Empirical studies are pretty conclusive on a strong correlation between central bank independence and low and stable inflation after controlling for other variables.
format Artículo
author Marcel Cullel, Mario
author_facet Marcel Cullel, Mario
author_sort Marcel Cullel, Mario
title Public trust and central banking
title_short Public trust and central banking
title_full Public trust and central banking
title_fullStr Public trust and central banking
title_full_unstemmed Public trust and central banking
title_sort public trust and central banking
publisher Banco Central de Chile
publishDate 2021
url https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12580/6143
work_keys_str_mv AT marcelcullelmario publictrustandcentralbanking
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