Independence, credibility, and communication of central banking: an overview

The institution of central-bank independence is often lauded as a great conquest of the accumulation of knowledge and the sensible setting of policy. The economic literature is filled with arguments for why an independent central bank would lead to better outcomes. To this prior, the experience of...

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Autores principales:	Pastén, Ernesto, Reis, Ricardo
Formato:	Artículo
Lenguaje:	English
Publicado:	Banco Central de Chile 2021
Materias:	BANCOS CENTRALES COMUNICACIÓN AUTONOMÍA
Acceso en línea:	https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12580/6144
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spelling	oai-20.500.12580-61442021-10-19T19:01:17Z Independence, credibility, and communication of central banking: an overview Pastén, Ernesto Reis, Ricardo BANCOS CENTRALES COMUNICACIÓN AUTONOMÍA The institution of central-bank independence is often lauded as a great conquest of the accumulation of knowledge and the sensible setting of policy. The economic literature is filled with arguments for why an independent central bank would lead to better outcomes. To this prior, the experience of the last couple of decades has added the supporting data. Independent central bankers have been, for the most part, able to keep inflation under control despite shocks and macroeconomic volatility. Whether during the Global Financial Crisis, through individual country slumps, or at the trough of the pandemic recession, independent central banks were typically part of the solution rather than part of the problem. Attacks on the independence of a central bank nowadays typically generate a strong pushback from the press and civil society. The institution of central-bank independence is often lauded as a great conquest of the accumulation of knowledge and the sensible setting of policy. The economic literature is filled with arguments for why an independent central bank would lead to better outcomes. To this prior, the experience of the last couple of decades has added the supporting data. Independent central bankers have been, for the most part, able to keep inflation under control despite shocks and macroeconomic volatility. Whether during the Global Financial Crisis, through individual country slumps, or at the trough of the pandemic recession, independent central banks were typically part of the solution rather than part of the problem. Attacks on the independence of a central bank nowadays typically generate a strong pushback from the press and civil society. 2021-10-19T18:34:56Z 2021-10-19T18:34:56Z 2021-10 Artículo 978-956-7421-69-5 978-956-7421-70-1 (pdf) 0717-6686 https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12580/6144 en Series on Central Banking Analysis and Economic Policies; no. 28 Serie Banca Central, análisis y políticas económicas; no. 28 Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/cl/ .pdf Sección o Parte de un Documento p. 01-14 application/pdf Banco Central de Chile
institution	Banco Central
collection	Banco Central
language	English
topic	BANCOS CENTRALES COMUNICACIÓN AUTONOMÍA
spellingShingle	BANCOS CENTRALES COMUNICACIÓN AUTONOMÍA Pastén, Ernesto Reis, Ricardo Independence, credibility, and communication of central banking: an overview
description	The institution of central-bank independence is often lauded as a great conquest of the accumulation of knowledge and the sensible setting of policy. The economic literature is filled with arguments for why an independent central bank would lead to better outcomes. To this prior, the experience of the last couple of decades has added the supporting data. Independent central bankers have been, for the most part, able to keep inflation under control despite shocks and macroeconomic volatility. Whether during the Global Financial Crisis, through individual country slumps, or at the trough of the pandemic recession, independent central banks were typically part of the solution rather than part of the problem. Attacks on the independence of a central bank nowadays typically generate a strong pushback from the press and civil society.
format	Artículo
author	Pastén, Ernesto Reis, Ricardo
author_facet	Pastén, Ernesto Reis, Ricardo
author_sort	Pastén, Ernesto
title	Independence, credibility, and communication of central banking: an overview
title_short	Independence, credibility, and communication of central banking: an overview
title_full	Independence, credibility, and communication of central banking: an overview
title_fullStr	Independence, credibility, and communication of central banking: an overview
title_full_unstemmed	Independence, credibility, and communication of central banking: an overview
title_sort	independence, credibility, and communication of central banking: an overview
publisher	Banco Central de Chile
publishDate	2021
url	https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12580/6144
work_keys_str_mv	AT pastenernesto independencecredibilityandcommunicationofcentralbankinganoverview AT reisricardo independencecredibilityandcommunicationofcentralbankinganoverview
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Independence, credibility, and communication of central banking: an overview

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