Husserl’s Phenomenology of Validity
What is a practical intention, particularly an evaluating intention? Are values representational states that work differently from epistemological truths? Are our perceptual experiences representational states? To simplify the inquiry, I will theoretically divide the questions into two groups: the...
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| Formato: | article |
| Lenguaje: | EN FR IT |
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Rosenberg & Sellier
2016
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| Acceso en línea: | https://doaj.org/article/0080a157bf624e23a28dd10a5b76a7b8 |
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| Sumario: | What is a practical intention, particularly an evaluating intention? Are values representational states that work differently from epistemological truths? Are our perceptual experiences representational states? To simplify the inquiry, I will theoretically divide the questions into two groups: the former concerning the distinction between signitive and practical intention and the latter pertaining to the objectivity of a value. The texts I will refer to are Husserl’s Ideas and Analysis.
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