Husserl’s Phenomenology of Validity
What is a practical intention, particularly an evaluating intention? Are values representational states that work differently from epistemological truths? Are our perceptual experiences representational states? To simplify the inquiry, I will theoretically divide the questions into two groups: the...
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Rosenberg & Sellier
2016
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oai:doaj.org-article:0080a157bf624e23a28dd10a5b76a7b82021-12-02T10:07:08ZHusserl’s Phenomenology of Validity10.13128/Phe_Mi-195942280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/0080a157bf624e23a28dd10a5b76a7b82016-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7113https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028 What is a practical intention, particularly an evaluating intention? Are values representational states that work differently from epistemological truths? Are our perceptual experiences representational states? To simplify the inquiry, I will theoretically divide the questions into two groups: the former concerning the distinction between signitive and practical intention and the latter pertaining to the objectivity of a value. The texts I will refer to are Husserl’s Ideas and Analysis. Susi FerrarelloRosenberg & Sellierarticleintentionalityactive and passive synthesissignitive actsAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 4 (2016) |
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intentionality active and passive synthesis signitive acts Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 |
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intentionality active and passive synthesis signitive acts Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 Susi Ferrarello Husserl’s Phenomenology of Validity |
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What is a practical intention, particularly an evaluating intention? Are values representational states that work differently from epistemological truths? Are our perceptual experiences representational states? To simplify the inquiry, I will theoretically divide the questions into two groups: the former concerning the distinction between signitive and practical intention and the latter pertaining to the objectivity of a value. The texts I will refer to are Husserl’s Ideas and Analysis.
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format |
article |
author |
Susi Ferrarello |
author_facet |
Susi Ferrarello |
author_sort |
Susi Ferrarello |
title |
Husserl’s Phenomenology of Validity |
title_short |
Husserl’s Phenomenology of Validity |
title_full |
Husserl’s Phenomenology of Validity |
title_fullStr |
Husserl’s Phenomenology of Validity |
title_full_unstemmed |
Husserl’s Phenomenology of Validity |
title_sort |
husserl’s phenomenology of validity |
publisher |
Rosenberg & Sellier |
publishDate |
2016 |
url |
https://doaj.org/article/0080a157bf624e23a28dd10a5b76a7b8 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT susiferrarello husserlsphenomenologyofvalidity |
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1718397629754245120 |