The evolution of indirect reciprocity under action and assessment generosity

Abstract Indirect reciprocity is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation based on social norms. This mechanism requires that individuals in a population observe and judge each other’s behaviors. Individuals with a good reputation are more likely to receive help from others. Previous work sugges...

Descripción completa

Guardado en:

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales:	Laura Schmid, Pouya Shati, Christian Hilbe, Krishnendu Chatterjee
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Nature Portfolio 2021
Materias:	Medicine R Science Q
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/0278322dd21e4c949dc304f49574a955
Etiquetas:	Agregar Etiqueta Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

id	oai:doaj.org-article:0278322dd21e4c949dc304f49574a955
record_format	dspace
spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:0278322dd21e4c949dc304f49574a9552021-12-02T17:51:16ZThe evolution of indirect reciprocity under action and assessment generosity10.1038/s41598-021-96932-12045-2322https://doaj.org/article/0278322dd21e4c949dc304f49574a9552021-08-01T00:00:00Zhttps://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-96932-1https://doaj.org/toc/2045-2322Abstract Indirect reciprocity is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation based on social norms. This mechanism requires that individuals in a population observe and judge each other’s behaviors. Individuals with a good reputation are more likely to receive help from others. Previous work suggests that indirect reciprocity is only effective when all relevant information is reliable and publicly available. Otherwise, individuals may disagree on how to assess others, even if they all apply the same social norm. Such disagreements can lead to a breakdown of cooperation. Here we explore whether the predominantly studied ‘leading eight’ social norms of indirect reciprocity can be made more robust by equipping them with an element of generosity. To this end, we distinguish between two kinds of generosity. According to assessment generosity, individuals occasionally assign a good reputation to group members who would usually be regarded as bad. According to action generosity, individuals occasionally cooperate with group members with whom they would usually defect. Using individual-based simulations, we show that the two kinds of generosity have a very different effect on the resulting reputation dynamics. Assessment generosity tends to add to the overall noise and allows defectors to invade. In contrast, a limited amount of action generosity can be beneficial in a few cases. However, even when action generosity is beneficial, the respective simulations do not result in full cooperation. Our results suggest that while generosity can favor cooperation when individuals use the most simple strategies of reciprocity, it is disadvantageous when individuals use more complex social norms.Laura SchmidPouya ShatiChristian HilbeKrishnendu ChatterjeeNature PortfolioarticleMedicineRScienceQENScientific Reports, Vol 11, Iss 1, Pp 1-14 (2021)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Medicine R Science Q
spellingShingle	Medicine R Science Q Laura Schmid Pouya Shati Christian Hilbe Krishnendu Chatterjee The evolution of indirect reciprocity under action and assessment generosity
description	Abstract Indirect reciprocity is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation based on social norms. This mechanism requires that individuals in a population observe and judge each other’s behaviors. Individuals with a good reputation are more likely to receive help from others. Previous work suggests that indirect reciprocity is only effective when all relevant information is reliable and publicly available. Otherwise, individuals may disagree on how to assess others, even if they all apply the same social norm. Such disagreements can lead to a breakdown of cooperation. Here we explore whether the predominantly studied ‘leading eight’ social norms of indirect reciprocity can be made more robust by equipping them with an element of generosity. To this end, we distinguish between two kinds of generosity. According to assessment generosity, individuals occasionally assign a good reputation to group members who would usually be regarded as bad. According to action generosity, individuals occasionally cooperate with group members with whom they would usually defect. Using individual-based simulations, we show that the two kinds of generosity have a very different effect on the resulting reputation dynamics. Assessment generosity tends to add to the overall noise and allows defectors to invade. In contrast, a limited amount of action generosity can be beneficial in a few cases. However, even when action generosity is beneficial, the respective simulations do not result in full cooperation. Our results suggest that while generosity can favor cooperation when individuals use the most simple strategies of reciprocity, it is disadvantageous when individuals use more complex social norms.
format	article
author	Laura Schmid Pouya Shati Christian Hilbe Krishnendu Chatterjee
author_facet	Laura Schmid Pouya Shati Christian Hilbe Krishnendu Chatterjee
author_sort	Laura Schmid
title	The evolution of indirect reciprocity under action and assessment generosity
title_short	The evolution of indirect reciprocity under action and assessment generosity
title_full	The evolution of indirect reciprocity under action and assessment generosity
title_fullStr	The evolution of indirect reciprocity under action and assessment generosity
title_full_unstemmed	The evolution of indirect reciprocity under action and assessment generosity
title_sort	evolution of indirect reciprocity under action and assessment generosity
publisher	Nature Portfolio
publishDate	2021
url	https://doaj.org/article/0278322dd21e4c949dc304f49574a955
work_keys_str_mv	AT lauraschmid theevolutionofindirectreciprocityunderactionandassessmentgenerosity AT pouyashati theevolutionofindirectreciprocityunderactionandassessmentgenerosity AT christianhilbe theevolutionofindirectreciprocityunderactionandassessmentgenerosity AT krishnenduchatterjee theevolutionofindirectreciprocityunderactionandassessmentgenerosity AT lauraschmid evolutionofindirectreciprocityunderactionandassessmentgenerosity AT pouyashati evolutionofindirectreciprocityunderactionandassessmentgenerosity AT christianhilbe evolutionofindirectreciprocityunderactionandassessmentgenerosity AT krishnenduchatterjee evolutionofindirectreciprocityunderactionandassessmentgenerosity
_version_	1718379267924951040

The evolution of indirect reciprocity under action and assessment generosity

Ejemplares similares