Comparing Different Levels of Technical Systems for a Modular Safety Approval—Why the State of the Art Does Not Dispense with System Tests Yet

While systems in the automotive industry have become increasingly complex, the related processes require comprehensive testing to be carried out at lower levels of a system. Nevertheless, the final safety validation is still required to be carried out at the system level by automotive standards like...

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Autores principales:	Björn Klamann, Hermann Winner
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	MDPI AG 2021
Materias:	safety validation automated driving systems decomposition modular safety approval modular testing fault tree analysis Technology T
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/061e1e2f986643f0bc17a2cd6009d8ab
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id	oai:doaj.org-article:061e1e2f986643f0bc17a2cd6009d8ab
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:061e1e2f986643f0bc17a2cd6009d8ab2021-11-25T17:26:13ZComparing Different Levels of Technical Systems for a Modular Safety Approval—Why the State of the Art Does Not Dispense with System Tests Yet10.3390/en142275161996-1073https://doaj.org/article/061e1e2f986643f0bc17a2cd6009d8ab2021-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/14/22/7516https://doaj.org/toc/1996-1073While systems in the automotive industry have become increasingly complex, the related processes require comprehensive testing to be carried out at lower levels of a system. Nevertheless, the final safety validation is still required to be carried out at the system level by automotive standards like ISO 26262. Using its guidelines for the development of automated vehicles and applying them for field operation tests has been proven to be economically unfeasible. The concept of a modular safety approval provides the opportunity to reduce the testing effort after updates and for a broader set of vehicle variants. In this paper, we present insufficiencies that occur on lower levels of hierarchy compared to the system level. Using a completely new approach, we show that errors arise due to faulty decomposition processes wherein, e.g., functions, test scenarios, risks, or requirements of a system are decomposed to the module level. Thus, we identify three main categories of errors: insufficiently functional architectures, performing the wrong tests, and performing the right tests wrongly. We provide more detailed errors and present examples from the research project UNICAR<i>agil</i>. Finally, these findings are taken to define rules for the development and testing of modules to dispense with system tests.Björn KlamannHermann WinnerMDPI AGarticlesafety validationautomated driving systemsdecompositionmodular safety approvalmodular testingfault tree analysisTechnologyTENEnergies, Vol 14, Iss 7516, p 7516 (2021)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	safety validation automated driving systems decomposition modular safety approval modular testing fault tree analysis Technology T
spellingShingle	safety validation automated driving systems decomposition modular safety approval modular testing fault tree analysis Technology T Björn Klamann Hermann Winner Comparing Different Levels of Technical Systems for a Modular Safety Approval—Why the State of the Art Does Not Dispense with System Tests Yet
description	While systems in the automotive industry have become increasingly complex, the related processes require comprehensive testing to be carried out at lower levels of a system. Nevertheless, the final safety validation is still required to be carried out at the system level by automotive standards like ISO 26262. Using its guidelines for the development of automated vehicles and applying them for field operation tests has been proven to be economically unfeasible. The concept of a modular safety approval provides the opportunity to reduce the testing effort after updates and for a broader set of vehicle variants. In this paper, we present insufficiencies that occur on lower levels of hierarchy compared to the system level. Using a completely new approach, we show that errors arise due to faulty decomposition processes wherein, e.g., functions, test scenarios, risks, or requirements of a system are decomposed to the module level. Thus, we identify three main categories of errors: insufficiently functional architectures, performing the wrong tests, and performing the right tests wrongly. We provide more detailed errors and present examples from the research project UNICAR<i>agil</i>. Finally, these findings are taken to define rules for the development and testing of modules to dispense with system tests.
format	article
author	Björn Klamann Hermann Winner
author_facet	Björn Klamann Hermann Winner
author_sort	Björn Klamann
title	Comparing Different Levels of Technical Systems for a Modular Safety Approval—Why the State of the Art Does Not Dispense with System Tests Yet
title_short	Comparing Different Levels of Technical Systems for a Modular Safety Approval—Why the State of the Art Does Not Dispense with System Tests Yet
title_full	Comparing Different Levels of Technical Systems for a Modular Safety Approval—Why the State of the Art Does Not Dispense with System Tests Yet
title_fullStr	Comparing Different Levels of Technical Systems for a Modular Safety Approval—Why the State of the Art Does Not Dispense with System Tests Yet
title_full_unstemmed	Comparing Different Levels of Technical Systems for a Modular Safety Approval—Why the State of the Art Does Not Dispense with System Tests Yet
title_sort	comparing different levels of technical systems for a modular safety approval—why the state of the art does not dispense with system tests yet
publisher	MDPI AG
publishDate	2021
url	https://doaj.org/article/061e1e2f986643f0bc17a2cd6009d8ab
work_keys_str_mv	AT bjornklamann comparingdifferentlevelsoftechnicalsystemsforamodularsafetyapprovalwhythestateoftheartdoesnotdispensewithsystemtestsyet AT hermannwinner comparingdifferentlevelsoftechnicalsystemsforamodularsafetyapprovalwhythestateoftheartdoesnotdispensewithsystemtestsyet
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Comparing Different Levels of Technical Systems for a Modular Safety Approval—Why the State of the Art Does Not Dispense with System Tests Yet

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