Inferring reputation promotes the evolution of cooperation in spatial social dilemma games.

In realistic world individuals with high reputation are more likely to influence the collective behaviors. Due to the cost and error of information dissemination, however, it is unreasonable to assign each individual with a complete cognitive power, which means that not everyone can accurately reali...

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Autores principales:	Zhen Wang, Lin Wang, Zi-Yu Yin, Cheng-Yi Xia
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Public Library of Science (PLoS) 2012
Materias:	Medicine R Science Q
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/099ba872c87f4139ad622304e215ec13
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:099ba872c87f4139ad622304e215ec132021-11-18T07:13:01ZInferring reputation promotes the evolution of cooperation in spatial social dilemma games.1932-620310.1371/journal.pone.0040218https://doaj.org/article/099ba872c87f4139ad622304e215ec132012-01-01T00:00:00Zhttps://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/pmid/22808120/?tool=EBIhttps://doaj.org/toc/1932-6203In realistic world individuals with high reputation are more likely to influence the collective behaviors. Due to the cost and error of information dissemination, however, it is unreasonable to assign each individual with a complete cognitive power, which means that not everyone can accurately realize others' reputation situation. Here we introduce the mechanism of inferring reputation into the selection of potential strategy sources to explore the evolution of cooperation. Before the game each player is assigned with a randomly distributed parameter p denoting his ability to infer the reputation of others. The parameter p of each individual is kept constant during the game. The value of p indicates that the neighbor possessing highest reputation is chosen with the probability p and randomly choosing an opponent is left with the probability 1-p. We find that this novel mechanism can be seen as an universally applicable promoter of cooperation, which works on various interaction networks and in different types of evolutionary game. Of particular interest is the fact that, in the early stages of evolutionary process, cooperators with high reputation who are easily regarded as the potential strategy donors can quickly lead to the formation of extremely robust clusters of cooperators that are impervious to defector attacks. These clusters eventually help cooperators reach their undisputed dominance, which transcends what can be warranted by the spatial reciprocity alone. Moreover, we provide complete phase diagrams to depict the impact of uncertainty in strategy adoptions and conclude that the effective interaction topology structure may be altered under such a mechanism. When the estimation of reputation is extended, we also show that the moderate value of evaluation factor enables cooperation to thrive best. We thus present a viable method of understanding the ubiquitous cooperative behaviors in nature and hope that it will inspire further studies to resolve social dilemmas.Zhen WangLin WangZi-Yu YinCheng-Yi XiaPublic Library of Science (PLoS)articleMedicineRScienceQENPLoS ONE, Vol 7, Iss 7, p e40218 (2012)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Medicine R Science Q
spellingShingle	Medicine R Science Q Zhen Wang Lin Wang Zi-Yu Yin Cheng-Yi Xia Inferring reputation promotes the evolution of cooperation in spatial social dilemma games.
description	In realistic world individuals with high reputation are more likely to influence the collective behaviors. Due to the cost and error of information dissemination, however, it is unreasonable to assign each individual with a complete cognitive power, which means that not everyone can accurately realize others' reputation situation. Here we introduce the mechanism of inferring reputation into the selection of potential strategy sources to explore the evolution of cooperation. Before the game each player is assigned with a randomly distributed parameter p denoting his ability to infer the reputation of others. The parameter p of each individual is kept constant during the game. The value of p indicates that the neighbor possessing highest reputation is chosen with the probability p and randomly choosing an opponent is left with the probability 1-p. We find that this novel mechanism can be seen as an universally applicable promoter of cooperation, which works on various interaction networks and in different types of evolutionary game. Of particular interest is the fact that, in the early stages of evolutionary process, cooperators with high reputation who are easily regarded as the potential strategy donors can quickly lead to the formation of extremely robust clusters of cooperators that are impervious to defector attacks. These clusters eventually help cooperators reach their undisputed dominance, which transcends what can be warranted by the spatial reciprocity alone. Moreover, we provide complete phase diagrams to depict the impact of uncertainty in strategy adoptions and conclude that the effective interaction topology structure may be altered under such a mechanism. When the estimation of reputation is extended, we also show that the moderate value of evaluation factor enables cooperation to thrive best. We thus present a viable method of understanding the ubiquitous cooperative behaviors in nature and hope that it will inspire further studies to resolve social dilemmas.
format	article
author	Zhen Wang Lin Wang Zi-Yu Yin Cheng-Yi Xia
author_facet	Zhen Wang Lin Wang Zi-Yu Yin Cheng-Yi Xia
author_sort	Zhen Wang
title	Inferring reputation promotes the evolution of cooperation in spatial social dilemma games.
title_short	Inferring reputation promotes the evolution of cooperation in spatial social dilemma games.
title_full	Inferring reputation promotes the evolution of cooperation in spatial social dilemma games.
title_fullStr	Inferring reputation promotes the evolution of cooperation in spatial social dilemma games.
title_full_unstemmed	Inferring reputation promotes the evolution of cooperation in spatial social dilemma games.
title_sort	inferring reputation promotes the evolution of cooperation in spatial social dilemma games.
publisher	Public Library of Science (PLoS)
publishDate	2012
url	https://doaj.org/article/099ba872c87f4139ad622304e215ec13
work_keys_str_mv	AT zhenwang inferringreputationpromotestheevolutionofcooperationinspatialsocialdilemmagames AT linwang inferringreputationpromotestheevolutionofcooperationinspatialsocialdilemmagames AT ziyuyin inferringreputationpromotestheevolutionofcooperationinspatialsocialdilemmagames AT chengyixia inferringreputationpromotestheevolutionofcooperationinspatialsocialdilemmagames
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Inferring reputation promotes the evolution of cooperation in spatial social dilemma games.

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