Inferring reputation promotes the evolution of cooperation in spatial social dilemma games.
In realistic world individuals with high reputation are more likely to influence the collective behaviors. Due to the cost and error of information dissemination, however, it is unreasonable to assign each individual with a complete cognitive power, which means that not everyone can accurately reali...
Guardado en:
| Autores principales: | , , , |
|---|---|
| Formato: | article |
| Lenguaje: | EN |
| Publicado: |
Public Library of Science (PLoS)
2012
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://doaj.org/article/099ba872c87f4139ad622304e215ec13 |
| Etiquetas: |
Agregar Etiqueta
Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!
|