When agreement-accepting free-riders are a necessary evil for the evolution of cooperation

Abstract Agreements and commitments have provided a novel mechanism to promote cooperation in social dilemmas in both one-shot and repeated games. Individuals requesting others to commit to cooperate (proposers) incur a cost, while their co-players are not necessarily required to pay any, allowing t...

Descripción completa

Guardado en:

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales:	Luis A. Martinez-Vaquero, The Anh Han, Luís Moniz Pereira, Tom Lenaerts
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Nature Portfolio 2017
Materias:	Medicine R Science Q
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/0a8668675a8e4065b0309d08a7123172
Etiquetas:	Agregar Etiqueta Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

id	oai:doaj.org-article:0a8668675a8e4065b0309d08a7123172
record_format	dspace
spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:0a8668675a8e4065b0309d08a71231722021-12-02T12:30:43ZWhen agreement-accepting free-riders are a necessary evil for the evolution of cooperation10.1038/s41598-017-02625-z2045-2322https://doaj.org/article/0a8668675a8e4065b0309d08a71231722017-05-01T00:00:00Zhttps://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-017-02625-zhttps://doaj.org/toc/2045-2322Abstract Agreements and commitments have provided a novel mechanism to promote cooperation in social dilemmas in both one-shot and repeated games. Individuals requesting others to commit to cooperate (proposers) incur a cost, while their co-players are not necessarily required to pay any, allowing them to free-ride on the proposal investment cost (acceptors). Although there is a clear complementarity in these behaviours, no dynamic evidence is currently available that proves that they coexist in different forms of commitment creation. Using a stochastic evolutionary model allowing for mixed population states, we identify non-trivial roles of acceptors as well as the importance of intention recognition in commitments. In the one-shot prisoner’s dilemma, alliances between proposers and acceptors are necessary to isolate defectors when proposers do not know the acceptance intentions of the others. However, when the intentions are clear beforehand, the proposers can emerge by themselves. In repeated games with noise, the incapacity of proposers and acceptors to set up alliances makes the emergence of the first harder whenever the latter are present. As a result, acceptors will exploit proposers and take over the population when an apology-forgiveness mechanism with too low apology cost is introduced, and hence reduce the overall cooperation level.Luis A. Martinez-VaqueroThe Anh HanLuís Moniz PereiraTom LenaertsNature PortfolioarticleMedicineRScienceQENScientific Reports, Vol 7, Iss 1, Pp 1-9 (2017)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Medicine R Science Q
spellingShingle	Medicine R Science Q Luis A. Martinez-Vaquero The Anh Han Luís Moniz Pereira Tom Lenaerts When agreement-accepting free-riders are a necessary evil for the evolution of cooperation
description	Abstract Agreements and commitments have provided a novel mechanism to promote cooperation in social dilemmas in both one-shot and repeated games. Individuals requesting others to commit to cooperate (proposers) incur a cost, while their co-players are not necessarily required to pay any, allowing them to free-ride on the proposal investment cost (acceptors). Although there is a clear complementarity in these behaviours, no dynamic evidence is currently available that proves that they coexist in different forms of commitment creation. Using a stochastic evolutionary model allowing for mixed population states, we identify non-trivial roles of acceptors as well as the importance of intention recognition in commitments. In the one-shot prisoner’s dilemma, alliances between proposers and acceptors are necessary to isolate defectors when proposers do not know the acceptance intentions of the others. However, when the intentions are clear beforehand, the proposers can emerge by themselves. In repeated games with noise, the incapacity of proposers and acceptors to set up alliances makes the emergence of the first harder whenever the latter are present. As a result, acceptors will exploit proposers and take over the population when an apology-forgiveness mechanism with too low apology cost is introduced, and hence reduce the overall cooperation level.
format	article
author	Luis A. Martinez-Vaquero The Anh Han Luís Moniz Pereira Tom Lenaerts
author_facet	Luis A. Martinez-Vaquero The Anh Han Luís Moniz Pereira Tom Lenaerts
author_sort	Luis A. Martinez-Vaquero
title	When agreement-accepting free-riders are a necessary evil for the evolution of cooperation
title_short	When agreement-accepting free-riders are a necessary evil for the evolution of cooperation
title_full	When agreement-accepting free-riders are a necessary evil for the evolution of cooperation
title_fullStr	When agreement-accepting free-riders are a necessary evil for the evolution of cooperation
title_full_unstemmed	When agreement-accepting free-riders are a necessary evil for the evolution of cooperation
title_sort	when agreement-accepting free-riders are a necessary evil for the evolution of cooperation
publisher	Nature Portfolio
publishDate	2017
url	https://doaj.org/article/0a8668675a8e4065b0309d08a7123172
work_keys_str_mv	AT luisamartinezvaquero whenagreementacceptingfreeridersareanecessaryevilfortheevolutionofcooperation AT theanhhan whenagreementacceptingfreeridersareanecessaryevilfortheevolutionofcooperation AT luismonizpereira whenagreementacceptingfreeridersareanecessaryevilfortheevolutionofcooperation AT tomlenaerts whenagreementacceptingfreeridersareanecessaryevilfortheevolutionofcooperation
_version_	1718394318100627456

When agreement-accepting free-riders are a necessary evil for the evolution of cooperation

Ejemplares similares