When agreement-accepting free-riders are a necessary evil for the evolution of cooperation

Abstract Agreements and commitments have provided a novel mechanism to promote cooperation in social dilemmas in both one-shot and repeated games. Individuals requesting others to commit to cooperate (proposers) incur a cost, while their co-players are not necessarily required to pay any, allowing t...

Descripción completa

Guardado en:
Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Luis A. Martinez-Vaquero, The Anh Han, Luís Moniz Pereira, Tom Lenaerts
Formato: article
Lenguaje:EN
Publicado: Nature Portfolio 2017
Materias:
R
Q
Acceso en línea:https://doaj.org/article/0a8668675a8e4065b0309d08a7123172
Etiquetas: Agregar Etiqueta
Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

Ejemplares similares