Role of the Industry in the Enforcement of the Tobacco Policy: Between Necessary Mistrust and Necessary Cooperation
Tobacco products are heavily regulated because, in particular, of their acknowledged harmfulness to health, with highly elevated prices as one of the most important means of discouraging consumption. One of the most serious threats to the effectiveness of the tobacco policy comes from the traffickin...
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Utrecht University School of Law
2021
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oai:doaj.org-article:0b9990380c7348c488116b80db90719f2021-11-08T08:17:04ZRole of the Industry in the Enforcement of the Tobacco Policy: Between Necessary Mistrust and Necessary Cooperation1871-515X10.36633/ulr.611https://doaj.org/article/0b9990380c7348c488116b80db90719f2021-05-01T00:00:00Zhttps://www.utrechtlawreview.org/articles/611https://doaj.org/toc/1871-515XTobacco products are heavily regulated because, in particular, of their acknowledged harmfulness to health, with highly elevated prices as one of the most important means of discouraging consumption. One of the most serious threats to the effectiveness of the tobacco policy comes from the trafficking of illicit tobacco, which is much cheaper, often of lower quality, and which reduces state and EU revenues. The achievement of tobacco policy objectives, in particular the combatting of illicit tobacco trade, depends on the participation of private actors, amongst which big industry plays a crucial role. Yet, the legal landscape of enforcement duties of the tobacco industry is a patchwork of instruments, unevenly affecting different players. In particular it includes controversial agreements between the major tobacco producers and the EU and Member States, to which three out of four major producers are subject. The agreement with the fourth – PMI – was not extended by the Commission in 2016. The decision as to the extension of the remaining agreements is looming. The objective of this article is to analyse the framework of duties of the tobacco industry in the enforcement of the tobacco policy, especially against illicit tobacco, and to reflect on whether the enforcement model, including the agreements with the tobacco producers, should be kept or abandoned.Stanisław ToszaUtrecht University School of Lawarticleenforcementillicit tobaccotobacco industrysmugglingcounterfeitingcomplianceLaw in general. Comparative and uniform law. JurisprudenceK1-7720ENUtrecht Law Review, Vol 17, Iss 1 (2021) |
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enforcement illicit tobacco tobacco industry smuggling counterfeiting compliance Law in general. Comparative and uniform law. Jurisprudence K1-7720 |
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enforcement illicit tobacco tobacco industry smuggling counterfeiting compliance Law in general. Comparative and uniform law. Jurisprudence K1-7720 Stanisław Tosza Role of the Industry in the Enforcement of the Tobacco Policy: Between Necessary Mistrust and Necessary Cooperation |
description |
Tobacco products are heavily regulated because, in particular, of their acknowledged harmfulness to health, with highly elevated prices as one of the most important means of discouraging consumption. One of the most serious threats to the effectiveness of the tobacco policy comes from the trafficking of illicit tobacco, which is much cheaper, often of lower quality, and which reduces state and EU revenues. The achievement of tobacco policy objectives, in particular the combatting of illicit tobacco trade, depends on the participation of private actors, amongst which big industry plays a crucial role. Yet, the legal landscape of enforcement duties of the tobacco industry is a patchwork of instruments, unevenly affecting different players. In particular it includes controversial agreements between the major tobacco producers and the EU and Member States, to which three out of four major producers are subject. The agreement with the fourth – PMI – was not extended by the Commission in 2016. The decision as to the extension of the remaining agreements is looming. The objective of this article is to analyse the framework of duties of the tobacco industry in the enforcement of the tobacco policy, especially against illicit tobacco, and to reflect on whether the enforcement model, including the agreements with the tobacco producers, should be kept or abandoned. |
format |
article |
author |
Stanisław Tosza |
author_facet |
Stanisław Tosza |
author_sort |
Stanisław Tosza |
title |
Role of the Industry in the Enforcement of the Tobacco Policy: Between Necessary Mistrust and Necessary Cooperation |
title_short |
Role of the Industry in the Enforcement of the Tobacco Policy: Between Necessary Mistrust and Necessary Cooperation |
title_full |
Role of the Industry in the Enforcement of the Tobacco Policy: Between Necessary Mistrust and Necessary Cooperation |
title_fullStr |
Role of the Industry in the Enforcement of the Tobacco Policy: Between Necessary Mistrust and Necessary Cooperation |
title_full_unstemmed |
Role of the Industry in the Enforcement of the Tobacco Policy: Between Necessary Mistrust and Necessary Cooperation |
title_sort |
role of the industry in the enforcement of the tobacco policy: between necessary mistrust and necessary cooperation |
publisher |
Utrecht University School of Law |
publishDate |
2021 |
url |
https://doaj.org/article/0b9990380c7348c488116b80db90719f |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT stanisławtosza roleoftheindustryintheenforcementofthetobaccopolicybetweennecessarymistrustandnecessarycooperation |
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1718442778129596416 |