Evolution of altruistic punishments among heterogeneous conditional cooperators

Abstract It has been known that altruistic punishments solve the free rider problem in public goods games. Considering spatial structure and considering pure strategies significant advances have been made in understanding the evolution of altruistic punishments. However, these models have not consid...

Descripción completa

Guardado en:

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal:	Balaraju Battu
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Nature Portfolio 2021
Materias:	Medicine R Science Q
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/0c271261d0ee42f19dd6c5dfe3df5198
Etiquetas:	Agregar Etiqueta Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

id	oai:doaj.org-article:0c271261d0ee42f19dd6c5dfe3df5198
record_format	dspace
spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:0c271261d0ee42f19dd6c5dfe3df51982021-12-02T14:59:09ZEvolution of altruistic punishments among heterogeneous conditional cooperators10.1038/s41598-021-89563-z2045-2322https://doaj.org/article/0c271261d0ee42f19dd6c5dfe3df51982021-05-01T00:00:00Zhttps://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-89563-zhttps://doaj.org/toc/2045-2322Abstract It has been known that altruistic punishments solve the free rider problem in public goods games. Considering spatial structure and considering pure strategies significant advances have been made in understanding the evolution of altruistic punishments. However, these models have not considered key behavior regularities observed in experimental and field settings, where the individuals behave like conditional cooperators who are more willing to donate and are also more willing to punish free riders. Considering these behavioral regularities, without imposing a spatial structure on the population, I propose an evolutionary agent-based model in which agents behave like conditional cooperators, each agent’s donation conditional on the difference between the number of donations in the past and the threshold value and the propensity value of the agent. Altruistic punishment depends on the difference between the threshold value of the focal agent and the randomly matched another agent. The simulations show that, for certain inflicted costs of punishments, generous altruistic punishments evolve and stabilize cooperation. The results show that, unlike previous models, it is not necessary to punish all free riders equally; it is necessary to do so in the case of the selfish free riders but not in the case of negative reciprocators.Balaraju BattuNature PortfolioarticleMedicineRScienceQENScientific Reports, Vol 11, Iss 1, Pp 1-12 (2021)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Medicine R Science Q
spellingShingle	Medicine R Science Q Balaraju Battu Evolution of altruistic punishments among heterogeneous conditional cooperators
description	Abstract It has been known that altruistic punishments solve the free rider problem in public goods games. Considering spatial structure and considering pure strategies significant advances have been made in understanding the evolution of altruistic punishments. However, these models have not considered key behavior regularities observed in experimental and field settings, where the individuals behave like conditional cooperators who are more willing to donate and are also more willing to punish free riders. Considering these behavioral regularities, without imposing a spatial structure on the population, I propose an evolutionary agent-based model in which agents behave like conditional cooperators, each agent’s donation conditional on the difference between the number of donations in the past and the threshold value and the propensity value of the agent. Altruistic punishment depends on the difference between the threshold value of the focal agent and the randomly matched another agent. The simulations show that, for certain inflicted costs of punishments, generous altruistic punishments evolve and stabilize cooperation. The results show that, unlike previous models, it is not necessary to punish all free riders equally; it is necessary to do so in the case of the selfish free riders but not in the case of negative reciprocators.
format	article
author	Balaraju Battu
author_facet	Balaraju Battu
author_sort	Balaraju Battu
title	Evolution of altruistic punishments among heterogeneous conditional cooperators
title_short	Evolution of altruistic punishments among heterogeneous conditional cooperators
title_full	Evolution of altruistic punishments among heterogeneous conditional cooperators
title_fullStr	Evolution of altruistic punishments among heterogeneous conditional cooperators
title_full_unstemmed	Evolution of altruistic punishments among heterogeneous conditional cooperators
title_sort	evolution of altruistic punishments among heterogeneous conditional cooperators
publisher	Nature Portfolio
publishDate	2021
url	https://doaj.org/article/0c271261d0ee42f19dd6c5dfe3df5198
work_keys_str_mv	AT balarajubattu evolutionofaltruisticpunishmentsamongheterogeneousconditionalcooperators
_version_	1718389183101272064

Evolution of altruistic punishments among heterogeneous conditional cooperators

Ejemplares similares