Cooperation and stability through periodic impulses.

Basic games, where each individual chooses between two strategies, illustrate several issues that immediately emerge from the standard approach that applies strategic reasoning, based on rational decisions, to predict population behavior where no rationality is assumed. These include how mutual coop...

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Autores principales:	Bo-Yu Zhang, Ross Cressman, Yi Tao
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Public Library of Science (PLoS) 2010
Materias:	Medicine R Science Q
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/0dc56cbc89674bf1b143f0d4f9429e6c
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:0dc56cbc89674bf1b143f0d4f9429e6c2021-11-25T06:24:58ZCooperation and stability through periodic impulses.1932-620310.1371/journal.pone.0009882https://doaj.org/article/0dc56cbc89674bf1b143f0d4f9429e6c2010-03-01T00:00:00Zhttps://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/pmid/20369003/?tool=EBIhttps://doaj.org/toc/1932-6203Basic games, where each individual chooses between two strategies, illustrate several issues that immediately emerge from the standard approach that applies strategic reasoning, based on rational decisions, to predict population behavior where no rationality is assumed. These include how mutual cooperation (which corresponds to the best outcome from the population perspective) can evolve when the only individually rational choice is to defect, illustrated by the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game, and how individuals can randomize between two strategies when neither is individually rational, illustrated by the Battle of the Sexes (BS) game that models male-female conflict over parental investment in offspring. We examine these questions from an evolutionary perspective where the evolutionary dynamics includes an impulsive effect that models sudden changes in collective population behavior. For the PD game, we show analytically that cooperation can either coexist with defection or completely take over the population, depending on the strength of the impulse. By extending these results for the PD game, we also show that males and females each evolve to a single strategy in the BS game when the impulsive effect is strong and that weak impulses stabilize the randomized strategies of this game.Bo-Yu ZhangRoss CressmanYi TaoPublic Library of Science (PLoS)articleMedicineRScienceQENPLoS ONE, Vol 5, Iss 3, p e9882 (2010)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Medicine R Science Q
spellingShingle	Medicine R Science Q Bo-Yu Zhang Ross Cressman Yi Tao Cooperation and stability through periodic impulses.
description	Basic games, where each individual chooses between two strategies, illustrate several issues that immediately emerge from the standard approach that applies strategic reasoning, based on rational decisions, to predict population behavior where no rationality is assumed. These include how mutual cooperation (which corresponds to the best outcome from the population perspective) can evolve when the only individually rational choice is to defect, illustrated by the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game, and how individuals can randomize between two strategies when neither is individually rational, illustrated by the Battle of the Sexes (BS) game that models male-female conflict over parental investment in offspring. We examine these questions from an evolutionary perspective where the evolutionary dynamics includes an impulsive effect that models sudden changes in collective population behavior. For the PD game, we show analytically that cooperation can either coexist with defection or completely take over the population, depending on the strength of the impulse. By extending these results for the PD game, we also show that males and females each evolve to a single strategy in the BS game when the impulsive effect is strong and that weak impulses stabilize the randomized strategies of this game.
format	article
author	Bo-Yu Zhang Ross Cressman Yi Tao
author_facet	Bo-Yu Zhang Ross Cressman Yi Tao
author_sort	Bo-Yu Zhang
title	Cooperation and stability through periodic impulses.
title_short	Cooperation and stability through periodic impulses.
title_full	Cooperation and stability through periodic impulses.
title_fullStr	Cooperation and stability through periodic impulses.
title_full_unstemmed	Cooperation and stability through periodic impulses.
title_sort	cooperation and stability through periodic impulses.
publisher	Public Library of Science (PLoS)
publishDate	2010
url	https://doaj.org/article/0dc56cbc89674bf1b143f0d4f9429e6c
work_keys_str_mv	AT boyuzhang cooperationandstabilitythroughperiodicimpulses AT rosscressman cooperationandstabilitythroughperiodicimpulses AT yitao cooperationandstabilitythroughperiodicimpulses
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Cooperation and stability through periodic impulses.

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