Pozycja Narodowego Banku Polskiego w systemie naczelnych rganów władzy państwowej
The position of the National Bank of Poland in the system of supreme state authorities. Analysis of selected issues The National Bank of Poland obtained the status of an independent constitutional body as a result of legal norms and political practice: its organization, functions and powers, and...
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| Formato: | article |
| Lenguaje: | EN PL |
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Ksiegarnia Akademicka Publishing
2014
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| Acceso en línea: | https://doaj.org/article/0fb8d38063c94663b54b0be97d7d368a |
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| Sumario: | The position of the National Bank of Poland in the system of supreme state authorities. Analysis of selected issues
The National Bank of Poland obtained the status of an independent constitutional body as a result of legal norms and political practice: its organization, functions and powers, and consequently the relationships with supreme state authorities, has significantly changed. The method and shape of regulations made by the legislator is an expression of preference for the entire banking model adopted in Poland: a two‑stage model, in which there is one central bank of the state and other commercial banks. The granting of exclusive rights to the NBP to issue money and to formulate and implement monetary policy as well as a prohibition on covering the budget deficit by way of contracting credit obligations to the State’s central bank in a meaningful way influenced on the NBP’s position: the bank became independent from the executive and the legislature. The control of the bank is limited as the consequence of the bank’s political neutrality and high degree of independence. As the result of not sufficient level of democratic supervision the central bank has been deprived of competence to issue generally binding legislation. Although the Polish National Bank is independent, it is obliged to cooperate with other authorities in the formulation and implementation of economic policy, assuming that does not infringe the implementation of monetary policy. NBP does not find his place in the Montesquieu’s tripartite separation of powers, but the scope of its functions and constitutional legal grounds justify fully its current position in the state.
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