Pozycja Narodowego Banku Polskiego w systemie naczelnych rganów władzy państwowej

The position of the National Bank of Poland in the system of supreme state authorities. Analysis of selected issues The National Bank of Poland obtained the status of an independent constitutional body as a result of legal norms and political practice: its organization, functions and powers, and...

Descripción completa

Guardado en:
Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Ewa Myślak
Formato: article
Lenguaje:EN
PL
Publicado: Ksiegarnia Akademicka Publishing 2014
Materias:
Law
K
J
Acceso en línea:https://doaj.org/article/0fb8d38063c94663b54b0be97d7d368a
Etiquetas: Agregar Etiqueta
Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!
id oai:doaj.org-article:0fb8d38063c94663b54b0be97d7d368a
record_format dspace
spelling oai:doaj.org-article:0fb8d38063c94663b54b0be97d7d368a2021-11-27T13:16:34ZPozycja Narodowego Banku Polskiego w systemie naczelnych rganów władzy państwowej10.12797/Politeja.11.2014.27.031733-67162391-6737https://doaj.org/article/0fb8d38063c94663b54b0be97d7d368a2014-01-01T00:00:00Zhttps://journals.akademicka.pl/politeja/article/view/3127https://doaj.org/toc/1733-6716https://doaj.org/toc/2391-6737 The position of the National Bank of Poland in the system of supreme state authorities. Analysis of selected issues The National Bank of Poland obtained the status of an independent constitutional body as a result of legal norms and political practice: its organization, functions and powers, and consequently the relationships with supreme state authorities, has significantly changed. The method and shape of regulations made by the legislator is an expression of preference for the entire banking model adopted in Poland: a two‑stage model, in which there is one central bank of the state and other commercial banks. The granting of exclusive rights to the NBP to issue money and to formulate and implement monetary policy as well as a prohibition on covering the budget deficit by way of contracting credit obligations to the State’s central bank in a meaningful way influenced on the NBP’s position: the bank became independent from the executive and the legislature. The control of the bank is limited as the consequence of the bank’s political neutrality and high degree of independence. As the result of not sufficient level of democratic supervision the central bank has been deprived of competence to issue generally binding legislation. Although the Polish National Bank is independent, it is obliged to cooperate with other authorities in the formulation and implementation of economic policy, assuming that does not infringe the implementation of monetary policy. NBP does not find his place in the Montesquieu’s tripartite separation of powers, but the scope of its functions and constitutional legal grounds justify fully its current position in the state. Ewa MyślakKsiegarnia Akademicka Publishingarticlebank centralnyNarodowy Bank PolskiPrezes NBPRada Polityki Pieniężnejustrój polityczny Rzeczypospolitej PolskiejLawKPolitical scienceJENPLPoliteja, Vol 11, Iss 1(27) (2014)
institution DOAJ
collection DOAJ
language EN
PL
topic bank centralny
Narodowy Bank Polski
Prezes NBP
Rada Polityki Pieniężnej
ustrój polityczny Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej
Law
K
Political science
J
spellingShingle bank centralny
Narodowy Bank Polski
Prezes NBP
Rada Polityki Pieniężnej
ustrój polityczny Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej
Law
K
Political science
J
Ewa Myślak
Pozycja Narodowego Banku Polskiego w systemie naczelnych rganów władzy państwowej
description The position of the National Bank of Poland in the system of supreme state authorities. Analysis of selected issues The National Bank of Poland obtained the status of an independent constitutional body as a result of legal norms and political practice: its organization, functions and powers, and consequently the relationships with supreme state authorities, has significantly changed. The method and shape of regulations made by the legislator is an expression of preference for the entire banking model adopted in Poland: a two‑stage model, in which there is one central bank of the state and other commercial banks. The granting of exclusive rights to the NBP to issue money and to formulate and implement monetary policy as well as a prohibition on covering the budget deficit by way of contracting credit obligations to the State’s central bank in a meaningful way influenced on the NBP’s position: the bank became independent from the executive and the legislature. The control of the bank is limited as the consequence of the bank’s political neutrality and high degree of independence. As the result of not sufficient level of democratic supervision the central bank has been deprived of competence to issue generally binding legislation. Although the Polish National Bank is independent, it is obliged to cooperate with other authorities in the formulation and implementation of economic policy, assuming that does not infringe the implementation of monetary policy. NBP does not find his place in the Montesquieu’s tripartite separation of powers, but the scope of its functions and constitutional legal grounds justify fully its current position in the state.
format article
author Ewa Myślak
author_facet Ewa Myślak
author_sort Ewa Myślak
title Pozycja Narodowego Banku Polskiego w systemie naczelnych rganów władzy państwowej
title_short Pozycja Narodowego Banku Polskiego w systemie naczelnych rganów władzy państwowej
title_full Pozycja Narodowego Banku Polskiego w systemie naczelnych rganów władzy państwowej
title_fullStr Pozycja Narodowego Banku Polskiego w systemie naczelnych rganów władzy państwowej
title_full_unstemmed Pozycja Narodowego Banku Polskiego w systemie naczelnych rganów władzy państwowej
title_sort pozycja narodowego banku polskiego w systemie naczelnych rganów władzy państwowej
publisher Ksiegarnia Akademicka Publishing
publishDate 2014
url https://doaj.org/article/0fb8d38063c94663b54b0be97d7d368a
work_keys_str_mv AT ewamyslak pozycjanarodowegobankupolskiegowsystemienaczelnychrganowwładzypanstwowej
_version_ 1718408543732760576