Evolutionary Game Analysis on Last Mile Delivery Resource Integration—Exploring the Behavioral Strategies between Logistics Service Providers, Property Service Companies and Customers

As resource integration plays a significant part in improving operational efficiency in the last mile delivery industry, there is an increasing popularity for logistics service providers (LSPs) to collaborate with property service companies (PSCs). Based on the evolutionary game theory, considering...

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Autores principales: Lin Zhou, Yanping Chen, Yi Jing, Youwei Jiang
Formato: article
Lenguaje:EN
Publicado: MDPI AG 2021
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Acceso en línea:https://doaj.org/article/10afb6279d244a8593aa66866eabd2f0
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spelling oai:doaj.org-article:10afb6279d244a8593aa66866eabd2f02021-11-11T19:48:45ZEvolutionary Game Analysis on Last Mile Delivery Resource Integration—Exploring the Behavioral Strategies between Logistics Service Providers, Property Service Companies and Customers10.3390/su1321122402071-1050https://doaj.org/article/10afb6279d244a8593aa66866eabd2f02021-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/13/21/12240https://doaj.org/toc/2071-1050As resource integration plays a significant part in improving operational efficiency in the last mile delivery industry, there is an increasing popularity for logistics service providers (LSPs) to collaborate with property service companies (PSCs). Based on the evolutionary game theory, considering the dual role of PSCs when collaborating with LSPs, a trilateral evolutionary game model between PSCs, LSPs, and customers (Cs) is established to analyze the strategic choices and explore the influencing factors on the tripartite strategy. The results show that (1) There are optimal profit allocation coefficients and cost-sharing coefficients to cause the system to reach a steady state. (2) The integration cost between LSPs and PSCs and the home delivery cost inhibit the strategic integration of the two enterprises. (3) PSCs are more sensitive to their benefits and costs than LSPs in the process of resource integration. (4) More precisely evaluating their potential loss caused by temporary integration will help the tripartite to make a more scientific choice of strategic behavior. (5) The increase of community premium income helps to improve the enthusiasm of Cs supporting strategic integration. (6) The behavior and decision-making choices of the three game players affect each other in the last mile delivery resource integration. (7) The indirect benefits, such as advertising during their integration, play a positive role. Finally, the MATLAB2020a software is applied to simulate and analyze the impact of key factors on strategy evolution, and we propose several useful suggestions to promote the development of last mile delivery resource integration.Lin ZhouYanping ChenYi JingYouwei JiangMDPI AGarticledual roleproperty service companieslast mile deliveryresource integrationevolutionary gameEnvironmental effects of industries and plantsTD194-195Renewable energy sourcesTJ807-830Environmental sciencesGE1-350ENSustainability, Vol 13, Iss 12240, p 12240 (2021)
institution DOAJ
collection DOAJ
language EN
topic dual role
property service companies
last mile delivery
resource integration
evolutionary game
Environmental effects of industries and plants
TD194-195
Renewable energy sources
TJ807-830
Environmental sciences
GE1-350
spellingShingle dual role
property service companies
last mile delivery
resource integration
evolutionary game
Environmental effects of industries and plants
TD194-195
Renewable energy sources
TJ807-830
Environmental sciences
GE1-350
Lin Zhou
Yanping Chen
Yi Jing
Youwei Jiang
Evolutionary Game Analysis on Last Mile Delivery Resource Integration—Exploring the Behavioral Strategies between Logistics Service Providers, Property Service Companies and Customers
description As resource integration plays a significant part in improving operational efficiency in the last mile delivery industry, there is an increasing popularity for logistics service providers (LSPs) to collaborate with property service companies (PSCs). Based on the evolutionary game theory, considering the dual role of PSCs when collaborating with LSPs, a trilateral evolutionary game model between PSCs, LSPs, and customers (Cs) is established to analyze the strategic choices and explore the influencing factors on the tripartite strategy. The results show that (1) There are optimal profit allocation coefficients and cost-sharing coefficients to cause the system to reach a steady state. (2) The integration cost between LSPs and PSCs and the home delivery cost inhibit the strategic integration of the two enterprises. (3) PSCs are more sensitive to their benefits and costs than LSPs in the process of resource integration. (4) More precisely evaluating their potential loss caused by temporary integration will help the tripartite to make a more scientific choice of strategic behavior. (5) The increase of community premium income helps to improve the enthusiasm of Cs supporting strategic integration. (6) The behavior and decision-making choices of the three game players affect each other in the last mile delivery resource integration. (7) The indirect benefits, such as advertising during their integration, play a positive role. Finally, the MATLAB2020a software is applied to simulate and analyze the impact of key factors on strategy evolution, and we propose several useful suggestions to promote the development of last mile delivery resource integration.
format article
author Lin Zhou
Yanping Chen
Yi Jing
Youwei Jiang
author_facet Lin Zhou
Yanping Chen
Yi Jing
Youwei Jiang
author_sort Lin Zhou
title Evolutionary Game Analysis on Last Mile Delivery Resource Integration—Exploring the Behavioral Strategies between Logistics Service Providers, Property Service Companies and Customers
title_short Evolutionary Game Analysis on Last Mile Delivery Resource Integration—Exploring the Behavioral Strategies between Logistics Service Providers, Property Service Companies and Customers
title_full Evolutionary Game Analysis on Last Mile Delivery Resource Integration—Exploring the Behavioral Strategies between Logistics Service Providers, Property Service Companies and Customers
title_fullStr Evolutionary Game Analysis on Last Mile Delivery Resource Integration—Exploring the Behavioral Strategies between Logistics Service Providers, Property Service Companies and Customers
title_full_unstemmed Evolutionary Game Analysis on Last Mile Delivery Resource Integration—Exploring the Behavioral Strategies between Logistics Service Providers, Property Service Companies and Customers
title_sort evolutionary game analysis on last mile delivery resource integration—exploring the behavioral strategies between logistics service providers, property service companies and customers
publisher MDPI AG
publishDate 2021
url https://doaj.org/article/10afb6279d244a8593aa66866eabd2f0
work_keys_str_mv AT linzhou evolutionarygameanalysisonlastmiledeliveryresourceintegrationexploringthebehavioralstrategiesbetweenlogisticsserviceproviderspropertyservicecompaniesandcustomers
AT yanpingchen evolutionarygameanalysisonlastmiledeliveryresourceintegrationexploringthebehavioralstrategiesbetweenlogisticsserviceproviderspropertyservicecompaniesandcustomers
AT yijing evolutionarygameanalysisonlastmiledeliveryresourceintegrationexploringthebehavioralstrategiesbetweenlogisticsserviceproviderspropertyservicecompaniesandcustomers
AT youweijiang evolutionarygameanalysisonlastmiledeliveryresourceintegrationexploringthebehavioralstrategiesbetweenlogisticsserviceproviderspropertyservicecompaniesandcustomers
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