Inequality as information: Wealth homophily facilitates the evolution of cooperation

Abstract Free-riding produces inequality in the prisoners’ dilemma: cooperators suffer costs that defectors avoid, thus putting them at a material disadvantage to their anti-social peers. This inequality, accordingly, conveys information about a social partner’s choices in past game play and raises...

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Auteurs principaux: Tim Johnson, Oleg Smirnov
Format: article
Langue:EN
Publié: Nature Portfolio 2018
Sujets:
R
Q
Accès en ligne:https://doaj.org/article/110b301bf25d452f8ef964dd965c0a8e
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