The Case for Participatory Realism in Scheler’s Ethics

might one ask how phenomenological commitments relate to value ontology. Consider Phil Blosser’s words: …the chief defect of Scheler’s phenomenology, like all philosophies of value, was the weakness of his treatment of the ontology of values. The insufficient development of this fundamental aspect...

Descripción completa

Guardado en:

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal:	J. Edward Hackett
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN FR IT
Publicado:	Rosenberg & Sellier 2016
Materias:	Scheler realism ontology Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/122add91998042f8b6b4859b661ce5a9
Etiquetas:	Agregar Etiqueta Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

id	oai:doaj.org-article:122add91998042f8b6b4859b661ce5a9
record_format	dspace
spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:122add91998042f8b6b4859b661ce5a92021-12-02T10:31:07ZThe Case for Participatory Realism in Scheler’s Ethics10.13128/Phe_Mi-195742280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/122add91998042f8b6b4859b661ce5a92016-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7133https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028 might one ask how phenomenological commitments relate to value ontology. Consider Phil Blosser’s words: …the chief defect of Scheler’s phenomenology, like all philosophies of value, was the weakness of his treatment of the ontology of values. The insufficient development of this fundamental aspect of Value Theory has left it especially vulnerable in a philosophical climate that has been distinguished, since the 1930s, by the major “growth industry” of Heideggerian ontology, making this appear probably the most critical defect of Scheler’s Formalismus*. In this paper, I will argue that being-an-act (Akt-sein) will provide us with insight into Scheler’s value ontology. My efforts rest on two fundamental premises: showing how Scheler’s phenomenology opens up into ontology, and how being-an-act is understood with that opening in mind in Scheler’s Idealism and Realism essay. In Part 1, I argue how phenomenologists can reify one-side of the intentional relation and generate different ontologies, and these thoughts underlie the opening of the Idealism and Realism. In Part 2, I show how being-an-act opens up into ontology. In Part 3, I reveal how the participatory sense of realism is shown in the intentional relation, and how persons participate in value. In the final section, the “ontologization” of the intentional relation is found in the problem of reality. J. Edward HackettRosenberg & SellierarticleSchelerrealismontologyAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 5 (2016)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN FR IT
topic	Scheler realism ontology Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
spellingShingle	Scheler realism ontology Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 J. Edward Hackett The Case for Participatory Realism in Scheler’s Ethics
description	might one ask how phenomenological commitments relate to value ontology. Consider Phil Blosser’s words: …the chief defect of Scheler’s phenomenology, like all philosophies of value, was the weakness of his treatment of the ontology of values. The insufficient development of this fundamental aspect of Value Theory has left it especially vulnerable in a philosophical climate that has been distinguished, since the 1930s, by the major “growth industry” of Heideggerian ontology, making this appear probably the most critical defect of Scheler’s Formalismus*. In this paper, I will argue that being-an-act (Akt-sein) will provide us with insight into Scheler’s value ontology. My efforts rest on two fundamental premises: showing how Scheler’s phenomenology opens up into ontology, and how being-an-act is understood with that opening in mind in Scheler’s Idealism and Realism essay. In Part 1, I argue how phenomenologists can reify one-side of the intentional relation and generate different ontologies, and these thoughts underlie the opening of the Idealism and Realism. In Part 2, I show how being-an-act opens up into ontology. In Part 3, I reveal how the participatory sense of realism is shown in the intentional relation, and how persons participate in value. In the final section, the “ontologization” of the intentional relation is found in the problem of reality.
format	article
author	J. Edward Hackett
author_facet	J. Edward Hackett
author_sort	J. Edward Hackett
title	The Case for Participatory Realism in Scheler’s Ethics
title_short	The Case for Participatory Realism in Scheler’s Ethics
title_full	The Case for Participatory Realism in Scheler’s Ethics
title_fullStr	The Case for Participatory Realism in Scheler’s Ethics
title_full_unstemmed	The Case for Participatory Realism in Scheler’s Ethics
title_sort	case for participatory realism in scheler’s ethics
publisher	Rosenberg & Sellier
publishDate	2016
url	https://doaj.org/article/122add91998042f8b6b4859b661ce5a9
work_keys_str_mv	AT jedwardhackett thecaseforparticipatoryrealisminschelersethics AT jedwardhackett caseforparticipatoryrealisminschelersethics
_version_	1718397103050326016

The Case for Participatory Realism in Scheler’s Ethics

Ejemplares similares