Joint Commitment and Collective Belief: a Revisionary Proposal

According to Margaret Gilbert, two or more people collectively believe that p if and only if they are jointly committed to believe that p as a body. But the way she construes joint commitment in her account – as a commitment of and by the several parties to “doing something as a body” – encourages...

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Autor principal:	Leo Townsend
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN FR IT
Publicado:	Rosenberg & Sellier 2016
Materias:	collective belief acceptance joint commitment Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/122dcd8133c34bb8b3ae5b92f10a281f
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:122dcd8133c34bb8b3ae5b92f10a281f2021-12-02T12:50:47ZJoint Commitment and Collective Belief: a Revisionary Proposal10.13128/Phe_Mi-181512280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/122dcd8133c34bb8b3ae5b92f10a281f2016-04-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7213https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028 According to Margaret Gilbert, two or more people collectively believe that p if and only if they are jointly committed to believe that p as a body. But the way she construes joint commitment in her account – as a commitment of and by the several parties to “doing something as a body” – encourages the thought that the phenomenon accounted for is not that of genuine belief. I explain why this concern arises and explore a different way of construing joint commitment, in order to avoid the concern. This leads me to propose a revised Gilbertian account of collective belief, according to which two or more people collectively believe that p if and only if they are jointly committed to p as true. Leo TownsendRosenberg & Sellierarticlecollective beliefacceptancejoint commitmentAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 9 (2016)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN FR IT
topic	collective belief acceptance joint commitment Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
spellingShingle	collective belief acceptance joint commitment Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 Leo Townsend Joint Commitment and Collective Belief: a Revisionary Proposal
description	According to Margaret Gilbert, two or more people collectively believe that p if and only if they are jointly committed to believe that p as a body. But the way she construes joint commitment in her account – as a commitment of and by the several parties to “doing something as a body” – encourages the thought that the phenomenon accounted for is not that of genuine belief. I explain why this concern arises and explore a different way of construing joint commitment, in order to avoid the concern. This leads me to propose a revised Gilbertian account of collective belief, according to which two or more people collectively believe that p if and only if they are jointly committed to p as true.
format	article
author	Leo Townsend
author_facet	Leo Townsend
author_sort	Leo Townsend
title	Joint Commitment and Collective Belief: a Revisionary Proposal
title_short	Joint Commitment and Collective Belief: a Revisionary Proposal
title_full	Joint Commitment and Collective Belief: a Revisionary Proposal
title_fullStr	Joint Commitment and Collective Belief: a Revisionary Proposal
title_full_unstemmed	Joint Commitment and Collective Belief: a Revisionary Proposal
title_sort	joint commitment and collective belief: a revisionary proposal
publisher	Rosenberg & Sellier
publishDate	2016
url	https://doaj.org/article/122dcd8133c34bb8b3ae5b92f10a281f
work_keys_str_mv	AT leotownsend jointcommitmentandcollectivebeliefarevisionaryproposal
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Joint Commitment and Collective Belief: a Revisionary Proposal

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