The Normativity of Institutions
Some philosophers have claimed that normativity is an essential feature of social institutions, and have identified the source of normativity in collective intentionality. In this paper I argue that (1) normativity is not essential for social institutions; (2) normativity has many sources and it is...
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Rosenberg & Sellier
2016
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oai:doaj.org-article:14c6f4861f6a4dd5ba5e0431f9fff1412021-12-02T12:05:59ZThe Normativity of Institutions10.13128/Phe_Mi-181572280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/14c6f4861f6a4dd5ba5e0431f9fff1412016-04-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7219https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028 Some philosophers have claimed that normativity is an essential feature of social institutions, and have identified the source of normativity in collective intentionality. In this paper I argue that (1) normativity is not essential for social institutions; (2) normativity has many sources and it is unlikely that a single theory is able to account for them all; (3) a powerful conception of institutions – the “rules in equilibrium” account – provides an adequate framework to represent the effects of normativity and to explain its social function; (4) it is a mistake to ask a theory of institutions to do more than that. While normativity is an important element of institutions, we should not build our social ontology on a single, specific conception of normativity. Francesco GualaRosenberg & SellierarticleinstitutionsnormsAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 9 (2016) |
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institutions norms Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 |
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institutions norms Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 Francesco Guala The Normativity of Institutions |
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Some philosophers have claimed that normativity is an essential feature of social institutions, and have identified the source of normativity in collective intentionality. In this paper I argue that (1) normativity is not essential for social institutions; (2) normativity has many sources and it is unlikely that a single theory is able to account for them all; (3) a powerful conception of institutions – the “rules in equilibrium” account – provides an adequate framework to represent the effects of normativity and to explain its social function; (4) it is a mistake to ask a theory of institutions to do more than that. While normativity is an important element of institutions, we should not build our social ontology on a single, specific conception of normativity.
|
format |
article |
author |
Francesco Guala |
author_facet |
Francesco Guala |
author_sort |
Francesco Guala |
title |
The Normativity of Institutions |
title_short |
The Normativity of Institutions |
title_full |
The Normativity of Institutions |
title_fullStr |
The Normativity of Institutions |
title_full_unstemmed |
The Normativity of Institutions |
title_sort |
normativity of institutions |
publisher |
Rosenberg & Sellier |
publishDate |
2016 |
url |
https://doaj.org/article/14c6f4861f6a4dd5ba5e0431f9fff141 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT francescoguala thenormativityofinstitutions AT francescoguala normativityofinstitutions |
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1718394675441696768 |