Incentive and Coordination in the Two-Sided Market: Evidence from the P2P Lending Market

Two-sided markets serve as information intermediaries by connecting participants on both sides. In this study, we focus on the coordination of participants in the P2P lending market using a coupon strategy as an incentive to attract investment. Using a two-sided market model, we find that when a pla...

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Autores principales:	Yingxiu Zhao, Baojuan Shi
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Hindawi Limited 2021
Materias:	Mathematics QA1-939
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/14f1483d94ec40e0840c4f1fa7798f05
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:14f1483d94ec40e0840c4f1fa7798f052021-11-22T01:11:27ZIncentive and Coordination in the Two-Sided Market: Evidence from the P2P Lending Market1607-887X10.1155/2021/9240374https://doaj.org/article/14f1483d94ec40e0840c4f1fa7798f052021-01-01T00:00:00Zhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/9240374https://doaj.org/toc/1607-887XTwo-sided markets serve as information intermediaries by connecting participants on both sides. In this study, we focus on the coordination of participants in the P2P lending market using a coupon strategy as an incentive to attract investment. Using a two-sided market model, we find that when a platform adopts the coupon strategy, (i) the platform utility and participants’ utility are both greater and (ii) the number of participants is greater. In addition, as most research on two-sided markets and coupon strategy focuses on theoretical models, our study provides empirical support using data from Renrendai.com over 2018 to 2019.Yingxiu ZhaoBaojuan ShiHindawi LimitedarticleMathematicsQA1-939ENDiscrete Dynamics in Nature and Society, Vol 2021 (2021)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Mathematics QA1-939
spellingShingle	Mathematics QA1-939 Yingxiu Zhao Baojuan Shi Incentive and Coordination in the Two-Sided Market: Evidence from the P2P Lending Market
description	Two-sided markets serve as information intermediaries by connecting participants on both sides. In this study, we focus on the coordination of participants in the P2P lending market using a coupon strategy as an incentive to attract investment. Using a two-sided market model, we find that when a platform adopts the coupon strategy, (i) the platform utility and participants’ utility are both greater and (ii) the number of participants is greater. In addition, as most research on two-sided markets and coupon strategy focuses on theoretical models, our study provides empirical support using data from Renrendai.com over 2018 to 2019.
format	article
author	Yingxiu Zhao Baojuan Shi
author_facet	Yingxiu Zhao Baojuan Shi
author_sort	Yingxiu Zhao
title	Incentive and Coordination in the Two-Sided Market: Evidence from the P2P Lending Market
title_short	Incentive and Coordination in the Two-Sided Market: Evidence from the P2P Lending Market
title_full	Incentive and Coordination in the Two-Sided Market: Evidence from the P2P Lending Market
title_fullStr	Incentive and Coordination in the Two-Sided Market: Evidence from the P2P Lending Market
title_full_unstemmed	Incentive and Coordination in the Two-Sided Market: Evidence from the P2P Lending Market
title_sort	incentive and coordination in the two-sided market: evidence from the p2p lending market
publisher	Hindawi Limited
publishDate	2021
url	https://doaj.org/article/14f1483d94ec40e0840c4f1fa7798f05
work_keys_str_mv	AT yingxiuzhao incentiveandcoordinationinthetwosidedmarketevidencefromthep2plendingmarket AT baojuanshi incentiveandcoordinationinthetwosidedmarketevidencefromthep2plendingmarket
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Incentive and Coordination in the Two-Sided Market: Evidence from the P2P Lending Market

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