Subject, Mode and Content in “We-Intentions”

Subject, Mode and Content in “We-Intentions”

Propositional attitudes compose of three factors: subject, mode and content. With collective propositional attitudes there is dispute as to which of these three factors the collectivity aspect attaches to. For Searle the collectivity aspect comes in with the mode of the propositional attitude – it...

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Autor principal: Michael Wilby
Formato: article
Lenguaje:EN
FR
IT
Publicado: Rosenberg & Sellier 2016
Materias:
collective intentionality
joint action
John Searle
Aesthetics
BH1-301
Ethics
BJ1-1725
Acceso en línea:https://doaj.org/article/15678936e2c54470b3c8ca4726d723a2
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spelling oai:doaj.org-article:15678936e2c54470b3c8ca4726d723a22021-12-02T08:22:56ZSubject, Mode and Content in “We-Intentions”10.13128/Phe_Mi-196272280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/15678936e2c54470b3c8ca4726d723a22016-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7074https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028 Propositional attitudes compose of three factors: subject, mode and content. With collective propositional attitudes there is dispute as to which of these three factors the collectivity aspect attaches to. For Searle the collectivity aspect comes in with the mode of the propositional attitude – it is a matter of two distinct individuals each having their own collective intention-in-action. I argue that there are ineliminable difficulties with the Searle’s individualistic analysis, and argue instead for the notion of a dual-subject mental state: a propositional attitude that, by its nature, takes two or more subjects. Michael WilbyRosenberg & Sellierarticlecollective intentionalityjoint actionJohn SearleAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 2 (2016)
institution DOAJ
collection DOAJ
language EN
FR
IT
topic collective intentionality
joint action
John Searle
Aesthetics
BH1-301
Ethics
BJ1-1725
spellingShingle collective intentionality
joint action
John Searle
Aesthetics
BH1-301
Ethics
BJ1-1725
Michael Wilby
Subject, Mode and Content in “We-Intentions”
description Propositional attitudes compose of three factors: subject, mode and content. With collective propositional attitudes there is dispute as to which of these three factors the collectivity aspect attaches to. For Searle the collectivity aspect comes in with the mode of the propositional attitude – it is a matter of two distinct individuals each having their own collective intention-in-action. I argue that there are ineliminable difficulties with the Searle’s individualistic analysis, and argue instead for the notion of a dual-subject mental state: a propositional attitude that, by its nature, takes two or more subjects.
format article
author Michael Wilby
author_facet Michael Wilby
author_sort Michael Wilby
title Subject, Mode and Content in “We-Intentions”
title_short Subject, Mode and Content in “We-Intentions”
title_full Subject, Mode and Content in “We-Intentions”
title_fullStr Subject, Mode and Content in “We-Intentions”
title_full_unstemmed Subject, Mode and Content in “We-Intentions”
title_sort subject, mode and content in “we-intentions”
publisher Rosenberg & Sellier
publishDate 2016
url https://doaj.org/article/15678936e2c54470b3c8ca4726d723a2
work_keys_str_mv AT michaelwilby subjectmodeandcontentinweintentions
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