The Mark of the Mental

In this paper, I want to show that the so-called intentionalist programme, according to which the qualitative aspects of the mental have to be brought back to its intentional features, is doomed to fail. For, pace Brentano, the property that constitutes the main part of such intentional features, i...

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Autor principal:	Alberto Voltolini
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN FR IT
Publicado:	Rosenberg & Sellier 2016
Materias:	intentionality intentionalism Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/15e9c26d4dfa403c9583012968eb3fda
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id	oai:doaj.org-article:15e9c26d4dfa403c9583012968eb3fda
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:15e9c26d4dfa403c9583012968eb3fda2021-12-02T09:29:57ZThe Mark of the Mental10.13128/Phe_Mi-195952280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/15e9c26d4dfa403c9583012968eb3fda2016-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7114https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028 In this paper, I want to show that the so-called intentionalist programme, according to which the qualitative aspects of the mental have to be brought back to its intentional features, is doomed to fail. For, pace Brentano, the property that constitutes the main part of such intentional features, i.e., intentionality, is not the mark of the mental, neither in the proper Brentanian sense, according to which intentionality is the both necessary and sufficient condition of the mental, nor in its ‘watered down’ counterpart recently defended by Tim Crane, according to which intentionality is just the necessary condition of the mental. However, this does not mean that being mental is just a heterogenous category. For there may be another mark of the mental, i.e., consciousness, in the phenomenological sense of the property of being experienced. Alberto VoltoliniRosenberg & SellierarticleintentionalityintentionalismAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 4 (2016)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN FR IT
topic	intentionality intentionalism Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
spellingShingle	intentionality intentionalism Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 Alberto Voltolini The Mark of the Mental
description	In this paper, I want to show that the so-called intentionalist programme, according to which the qualitative aspects of the mental have to be brought back to its intentional features, is doomed to fail. For, pace Brentano, the property that constitutes the main part of such intentional features, i.e., intentionality, is not the mark of the mental, neither in the proper Brentanian sense, according to which intentionality is the both necessary and sufficient condition of the mental, nor in its ‘watered down’ counterpart recently defended by Tim Crane, according to which intentionality is just the necessary condition of the mental. However, this does not mean that being mental is just a heterogenous category. For there may be another mark of the mental, i.e., consciousness, in the phenomenological sense of the property of being experienced.
format	article
author	Alberto Voltolini
author_facet	Alberto Voltolini
author_sort	Alberto Voltolini
title	The Mark of the Mental
title_short	The Mark of the Mental
title_full	The Mark of the Mental
title_fullStr	The Mark of the Mental
title_full_unstemmed	The Mark of the Mental
title_sort	mark of the mental
publisher	Rosenberg & Sellier
publishDate	2016
url	https://doaj.org/article/15e9c26d4dfa403c9583012968eb3fda
work_keys_str_mv	AT albertovoltolini themarkofthemental AT albertovoltolini markofthemental
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The Mark of the Mental

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