The Mark of the Mental
In this paper, I want to show that the so-called intentionalist programme, according to which the qualitative aspects of the mental have to be brought back to its intentional features, is doomed to fail. For, pace Brentano, the property that constitutes the main part of such intentional features, i...
Guardado en:
Autor principal: | Alberto Voltolini |
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Formato: | article |
Lenguaje: | EN FR IT |
Publicado: |
Rosenberg & Sellier
2016
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://doaj.org/article/15e9c26d4dfa403c9583012968eb3fda |
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