The dual process model of moral judgement

In this article I analyse the dual process model of moral judgement. First, I set out Joshua Greene’s and Jonathan Haidt’s propositions, which represent two schools of thought on this theory. Next, I conduct a number of methodological reviews. On the one hand, I argue that the method used is tautolo...

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Autor principal:	Pedro Jesús Pérez Zafrilla
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	ES
Publicado:	Universidad Pontificia Comillas 2021
Materias:	dual process model jonathan haidt joshua greene dilemmas Philosophy. Psychology. Religion B Philosophy (General) B1-5802
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/18003d11803d46d4aa98edef4724f477
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id	oai:doaj.org-article:18003d11803d46d4aa98edef4724f477
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:18003d11803d46d4aa98edef4724f4772021-11-30T15:18:12ZThe dual process model of moral judgement0031-47492386-582210.14422/pen.v77.i295.y2021.006https://doaj.org/article/18003d11803d46d4aa98edef4724f4772021-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://revistas.comillas.edu/index.php/pensamiento/article/view/17543https://doaj.org/toc/0031-4749https://doaj.org/toc/2386-5822In this article I analyse the dual process model of moral judgement. First, I set out Joshua Greene’s and Jonathan Haidt’s propositions, which represent two schools of thought on this theory. Next, I conduct a number of methodological reviews. On the one hand, I argue that the method used is tautological, while on the other, I show that the use of dilemmas is not an adequate tool with which to account for moral deliberation.Pedro Jesús Pérez ZafrillaUniversidad Pontificia Comillasarticledual process modeljonathan haidtjoshua greenedilemmasPhilosophy. Psychology. ReligionBPhilosophy (General)B1-5802ESPensamiento. Revista de Investigación e Información Filosófica, Vol 77, Iss Extra 295, Pp 511-521 (2021)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	ES
topic	dual process model jonathan haidt joshua greene dilemmas Philosophy. Psychology. Religion B Philosophy (General) B1-5802
spellingShingle	dual process model jonathan haidt joshua greene dilemmas Philosophy. Psychology. Religion B Philosophy (General) B1-5802 Pedro Jesús Pérez Zafrilla The dual process model of moral judgement
description	In this article I analyse the dual process model of moral judgement. First, I set out Joshua Greene’s and Jonathan Haidt’s propositions, which represent two schools of thought on this theory. Next, I conduct a number of methodological reviews. On the one hand, I argue that the method used is tautological, while on the other, I show that the use of dilemmas is not an adequate tool with which to account for moral deliberation.
format	article
author	Pedro Jesús Pérez Zafrilla
author_facet	Pedro Jesús Pérez Zafrilla
author_sort	Pedro Jesús Pérez Zafrilla
title	The dual process model of moral judgement
title_short	The dual process model of moral judgement
title_full	The dual process model of moral judgement
title_fullStr	The dual process model of moral judgement
title_full_unstemmed	The dual process model of moral judgement
title_sort	dual process model of moral judgement
publisher	Universidad Pontificia Comillas
publishDate	2021
url	https://doaj.org/article/18003d11803d46d4aa98edef4724f477
work_keys_str_mv	AT pedrojesusperezzafrilla thedualprocessmodelofmoraljudgement AT pedrojesusperezzafrilla dualprocessmodelofmoraljudgement
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The dual process model of moral judgement

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