When a Hybrid Account of Disorder is not Enough: The Case of Gender Dysphoria

In this paper I discuss Wakefield’s account of mental disorder as applied to the case of gender dysphoria (GD). I argue that despite being a hybrid account which brings together a naturalistic and normative element in order to avoid pathologising normal or expectable states, the theory alone is stil...

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Autor principal:	Kathleen Murphy-Hollies
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	University of Rijeka. Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences 2021
Materias:	mental disorder Wakefield hybrid gender dysphoria DSM Philosophy (General) B1-5802
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/18aaf6f4424f438a9825b3c89394ff00
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:18aaf6f4424f438a9825b3c89394ff002021-12-01T12:44:58ZWhen a Hybrid Account of Disorder is not Enough: The Case of Gender Dysphoria1845-84751849-0514https://doaj.org/article/18aaf6f4424f438a9825b3c89394ff002021-01-01T00:00:00Zhttps://hrcak.srce.hr/file/386391https://doaj.org/toc/1845-8475https://doaj.org/toc/1849-0514In this paper I discuss Wakefield’s account of mental disorder as applied to the case of gender dysphoria (GD). I argue that despite being a hybrid account which brings together a naturalistic and normative element in order to avoid pathologising normal or expectable states, the theory alone is still not extensive enough to answer the question of whether GD should be classed as a disorder. I suggest that the hybrid account falls short in adequately investigating how the harm and dysfunction in cases of GD relate to each other, and secondly that the question of why some dysfunction is disvalued and experienced as harmful requires further consideration. This masks further analysis of patients’ distress and results in an unhelpful overlap of two types of clinical patients within a diagnosis of GD; those with gender-role dysphoria and those with sex dysphoria. These two conditions can be associated with different harms and dysfunctions but Wakefield’s hybrid account does not have the tools to recognise this. This misunderstanding of the sources of dysfunction and harm in those diagnosed with GD risks ineffective treatment for patients and reinforcing the very same prejudiced norms which were conducive to the state being experienced as harmful in the first place. The theory needs to engage, to a surprising and so far unacknowledged extent, with sociological concepts such as the categorisation and stratification of groups in society and the mechanism of systemic oppression, in order to answer the question of whether GD should be classed as a mental disorder. Only then can it successfully avoid pathologising normal or expectable states, as has been seen in past ‘illnesses’ such as homosexuality and ‘drapetomania’.Kathleen Murphy-HolliesUniversity of Rijeka. Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences articlemental disorderWakefieldhybridgender dysphoriaDSMPhilosophy (General)B1-5802ENEuropean Journal of Analytic Philosophy, Vol 17, Iss 2, Pp S6-26 (2021)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	mental disorder Wakefield hybrid gender dysphoria DSM Philosophy (General) B1-5802
spellingShingle	mental disorder Wakefield hybrid gender dysphoria DSM Philosophy (General) B1-5802 Kathleen Murphy-Hollies When a Hybrid Account of Disorder is not Enough: The Case of Gender Dysphoria
description	In this paper I discuss Wakefield’s account of mental disorder as applied to the case of gender dysphoria (GD). I argue that despite being a hybrid account which brings together a naturalistic and normative element in order to avoid pathologising normal or expectable states, the theory alone is still not extensive enough to answer the question of whether GD should be classed as a disorder. I suggest that the hybrid account falls short in adequately investigating how the harm and dysfunction in cases of GD relate to each other, and secondly that the question of why some dysfunction is disvalued and experienced as harmful requires further consideration. This masks further analysis of patients’ distress and results in an unhelpful overlap of two types of clinical patients within a diagnosis of GD; those with gender-role dysphoria and those with sex dysphoria. These two conditions can be associated with different harms and dysfunctions but Wakefield’s hybrid account does not have the tools to recognise this. This misunderstanding of the sources of dysfunction and harm in those diagnosed with GD risks ineffective treatment for patients and reinforcing the very same prejudiced norms which were conducive to the state being experienced as harmful in the first place. The theory needs to engage, to a surprising and so far unacknowledged extent, with sociological concepts such as the categorisation and stratification of groups in society and the mechanism of systemic oppression, in order to answer the question of whether GD should be classed as a mental disorder. Only then can it successfully avoid pathologising normal or expectable states, as has been seen in past ‘illnesses’ such as homosexuality and ‘drapetomania’.
format	article
author	Kathleen Murphy-Hollies
author_facet	Kathleen Murphy-Hollies
author_sort	Kathleen Murphy-Hollies
title	When a Hybrid Account of Disorder is not Enough: The Case of Gender Dysphoria
title_short	When a Hybrid Account of Disorder is not Enough: The Case of Gender Dysphoria
title_full	When a Hybrid Account of Disorder is not Enough: The Case of Gender Dysphoria
title_fullStr	When a Hybrid Account of Disorder is not Enough: The Case of Gender Dysphoria
title_full_unstemmed	When a Hybrid Account of Disorder is not Enough: The Case of Gender Dysphoria
title_sort	when a hybrid account of disorder is not enough: the case of gender dysphoria
publisher	University of Rijeka. Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
publishDate	2021
url	https://doaj.org/article/18aaf6f4424f438a9825b3c89394ff00
work_keys_str_mv	AT kathleenmurphyhollies whenahybridaccountofdisorderisnotenoughthecaseofgenderdysphoria
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When a Hybrid Account of Disorder is not Enough: The Case of Gender Dysphoria

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