On the role of hypocrisy in escaping the tragedy of the commons

Abstract We study the emergence of cooperation in large spatial public goods games. Without employing severe social-pressure against “defectors”, or alternatively, significantly rewarding “cooperators”, theoretical models typically predict a system collapse in a way that is reminiscent of the “trage...

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Autores principales:	Amos Korman, Robin Vacus
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Nature Portfolio 2021
Materias:	Medicine R Science Q
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/192f5a53f96247648aea0d6b21d97daf
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:192f5a53f96247648aea0d6b21d97daf2021-12-02T15:27:33ZOn the role of hypocrisy in escaping the tragedy of the commons10.1038/s41598-021-97001-32045-2322https://doaj.org/article/192f5a53f96247648aea0d6b21d97daf2021-09-01T00:00:00Zhttps://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-97001-3https://doaj.org/toc/2045-2322Abstract We study the emergence of cooperation in large spatial public goods games. Without employing severe social-pressure against “defectors”, or alternatively, significantly rewarding “cooperators”, theoretical models typically predict a system collapse in a way that is reminiscent of the “tragedy-of-the-commons” metaphor. Drawing on a dynamic network model, this paper demonstrates how cooperation can emerge when the social-pressure is mild. This is achieved with the aid of an additional behavior called “hypocrisy”, which appears to be cooperative from the external observer’s perspective but in fact hardly contributes to the social-welfare. Our model assumes that social-pressure is induced over both defectors and hypocritical players, though the extent of which may differ. Our main result indicates that the emergence of cooperation highly depends on the extent of social-pressure applied against hypocritical players. Setting it to be at some intermediate range below the one employed against defectors allows a system composed almost exclusively of defectors to transform into a fully cooperative one quickly. Conversely, when the social-pressure against hypocritical players is either too low or too high, the system remains locked in a degenerate configuration.Amos KormanRobin VacusNature PortfolioarticleMedicineRScienceQENScientific Reports, Vol 11, Iss 1, Pp 1-9 (2021)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Medicine R Science Q
spellingShingle	Medicine R Science Q Amos Korman Robin Vacus On the role of hypocrisy in escaping the tragedy of the commons
description	Abstract We study the emergence of cooperation in large spatial public goods games. Without employing severe social-pressure against “defectors”, or alternatively, significantly rewarding “cooperators”, theoretical models typically predict a system collapse in a way that is reminiscent of the “tragedy-of-the-commons” metaphor. Drawing on a dynamic network model, this paper demonstrates how cooperation can emerge when the social-pressure is mild. This is achieved with the aid of an additional behavior called “hypocrisy”, which appears to be cooperative from the external observer’s perspective but in fact hardly contributes to the social-welfare. Our model assumes that social-pressure is induced over both defectors and hypocritical players, though the extent of which may differ. Our main result indicates that the emergence of cooperation highly depends on the extent of social-pressure applied against hypocritical players. Setting it to be at some intermediate range below the one employed against defectors allows a system composed almost exclusively of defectors to transform into a fully cooperative one quickly. Conversely, when the social-pressure against hypocritical players is either too low or too high, the system remains locked in a degenerate configuration.
format	article
author	Amos Korman Robin Vacus
author_facet	Amos Korman Robin Vacus
author_sort	Amos Korman
title	On the role of hypocrisy in escaping the tragedy of the commons
title_short	On the role of hypocrisy in escaping the tragedy of the commons
title_full	On the role of hypocrisy in escaping the tragedy of the commons
title_fullStr	On the role of hypocrisy in escaping the tragedy of the commons
title_full_unstemmed	On the role of hypocrisy in escaping the tragedy of the commons
title_sort	on the role of hypocrisy in escaping the tragedy of the commons
publisher	Nature Portfolio
publishDate	2021
url	https://doaj.org/article/192f5a53f96247648aea0d6b21d97daf
work_keys_str_mv	AT amoskorman ontheroleofhypocrisyinescapingthetragedyofthecommons AT robinvacus ontheroleofhypocrisyinescapingthetragedyofthecommons
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On the role of hypocrisy in escaping the tragedy of the commons

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