Group contracts and sustainability: Experimental evidence from smallholder seed production.

Contract farming in seed production has played an instrumental role in bringing private investment into seed research and production. As developing countries have predominantly small and marginal farmers, the number of inefficiencies that arise from seed contractual agreements hinders producers from...

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Autores principales: Prakashan Chellattan Veettil, Yashodha, Judit Johny
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Publicado: Public Library of Science (PLoS) 2021
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Acceso en línea:https://doaj.org/article/19465667088e439785422cd86fd808fe
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spelling oai:doaj.org-article:19465667088e439785422cd86fd808fe2021-12-02T20:14:59ZGroup contracts and sustainability: Experimental evidence from smallholder seed production.1932-620310.1371/journal.pone.0255176https://doaj.org/article/19465667088e439785422cd86fd808fe2021-01-01T00:00:00Zhttps://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0255176https://doaj.org/toc/1932-6203Contract farming in seed production has played an instrumental role in bringing private investment into seed research and production. As developing countries have predominantly small and marginal farmers, the number of inefficiencies that arise from seed contractual agreements hinders producers from realizing the full potential benefits from seed contracts. We carried out an economic experiment with real producers and organizers currently engaged in seed production to analyze their preference for group seed contracts, its sustainability and welfare implications in the seed value chain. The producers are offered two types of group contracts: B and C. Contract B involves a company-organizer-seed producer group (SPG) whereas contract C removes the organizer and directly engages with the SPG (company → SPG). In the experiment, producers are asked to choose between an existing contract and either of the proposed group contracts. The experiment consists of two treatments: (i) concealed and revealed price information between agents, and (ii) presence and absence of a local organizer while making the decision. We find that the preference for group contract B is higher than for group contract C, suggesting the need for producers bargaining which can be achieved through group contract in the existing contract, Bargaining is high (6.3 percentage points) when price information is concealed. SPGs survive for about four out of five rounds and more than half of the groups (53%) formed in the first round survived throughout the five rounds, indicating a very high group sustainability.Prakashan Chellattan VeettilYashodhaJudit JohnyPublic Library of Science (PLoS)articleMedicineRScienceQENPLoS ONE, Vol 16, Iss 8, p e0255176 (2021)
institution DOAJ
collection DOAJ
language EN
topic Medicine
R
Science
Q
spellingShingle Medicine
R
Science
Q
Prakashan Chellattan Veettil
Yashodha
Judit Johny
Group contracts and sustainability: Experimental evidence from smallholder seed production.
description Contract farming in seed production has played an instrumental role in bringing private investment into seed research and production. As developing countries have predominantly small and marginal farmers, the number of inefficiencies that arise from seed contractual agreements hinders producers from realizing the full potential benefits from seed contracts. We carried out an economic experiment with real producers and organizers currently engaged in seed production to analyze their preference for group seed contracts, its sustainability and welfare implications in the seed value chain. The producers are offered two types of group contracts: B and C. Contract B involves a company-organizer-seed producer group (SPG) whereas contract C removes the organizer and directly engages with the SPG (company → SPG). In the experiment, producers are asked to choose between an existing contract and either of the proposed group contracts. The experiment consists of two treatments: (i) concealed and revealed price information between agents, and (ii) presence and absence of a local organizer while making the decision. We find that the preference for group contract B is higher than for group contract C, suggesting the need for producers bargaining which can be achieved through group contract in the existing contract, Bargaining is high (6.3 percentage points) when price information is concealed. SPGs survive for about four out of five rounds and more than half of the groups (53%) formed in the first round survived throughout the five rounds, indicating a very high group sustainability.
format article
author Prakashan Chellattan Veettil
Yashodha
Judit Johny
author_facet Prakashan Chellattan Veettil
Yashodha
Judit Johny
author_sort Prakashan Chellattan Veettil
title Group contracts and sustainability: Experimental evidence from smallholder seed production.
title_short Group contracts and sustainability: Experimental evidence from smallholder seed production.
title_full Group contracts and sustainability: Experimental evidence from smallholder seed production.
title_fullStr Group contracts and sustainability: Experimental evidence from smallholder seed production.
title_full_unstemmed Group contracts and sustainability: Experimental evidence from smallholder seed production.
title_sort group contracts and sustainability: experimental evidence from smallholder seed production.
publisher Public Library of Science (PLoS)
publishDate 2021
url https://doaj.org/article/19465667088e439785422cd86fd808fe
work_keys_str_mv AT prakashanchellattanveettil groupcontractsandsustainabilityexperimentalevidencefromsmallholderseedproduction
AT yashodha groupcontractsandsustainabilityexperimentalevidencefromsmallholderseedproduction
AT juditjohny groupcontractsandsustainabilityexperimentalevidencefromsmallholderseedproduction
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