“Finding the Feel”: The Matching Content Challenge to Cognitive Phenomenology

From the first-person point of view, seeing a red square is very different from thinking about a red square, hearing an alarm sound is very different from thinking that an alarm is sounding, and smelling freshly-roasted coffee is very different from thinking that there is feshly-roasted coffee in o...

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Autores principales:	Tim Bayne, Tom McClelland
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN FR IT
Publicado:	Rosenberg & Sellier 2017
Materias:	mental content cognitive phenomenology perceptual content fregean content Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/1961aabbe103404eb875cdb077384729
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:1961aabbe103404eb875cdb0773847292021-12-02T13:03:27Z“Finding the Feel”: The Matching Content Challenge to Cognitive Phenomenology10.13128/Phe_Mi-200902280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/1961aabbe103404eb875cdb0773847292017-01-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7227https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028 From the first-person point of view, seeing a red square is very different from thinking about a red square, hearing an alarm sound is very different from thinking that an alarm is sounding, and smelling freshly-roasted coffee is very different from thinking that there is feshly-roasted coffee in one’s vicinity. How might the familiar contrast between representing a fact in thought and representing it in perception be captured? One influential idea is that perceptual states are phenomenally conscious whereas thoughts are not. However, those theorists who hold that thoughts have a distinctive kind of phenomenal character – often known as “cognitive phenomenology” – cannot account for the contrast between thought and perception in this manner. This paper examines the various options that are available to advocates of cognitive phenomenology for capturing the experiential contrast between thought and perception, and argues that each of them faces serious challenges. Tim BayneTom McClellandRosenberg & Sellierarticlemental contentcognitive phenomenologyperceptual contentfregean contentAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 10 (2017)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN FR IT
topic	mental content cognitive phenomenology perceptual content fregean content Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
spellingShingle	mental content cognitive phenomenology perceptual content fregean content Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 Tim Bayne Tom McClelland “Finding the Feel”: The Matching Content Challenge to Cognitive Phenomenology
description	From the first-person point of view, seeing a red square is very different from thinking about a red square, hearing an alarm sound is very different from thinking that an alarm is sounding, and smelling freshly-roasted coffee is very different from thinking that there is feshly-roasted coffee in one’s vicinity. How might the familiar contrast between representing a fact in thought and representing it in perception be captured? One influential idea is that perceptual states are phenomenally conscious whereas thoughts are not. However, those theorists who hold that thoughts have a distinctive kind of phenomenal character – often known as “cognitive phenomenology” – cannot account for the contrast between thought and perception in this manner. This paper examines the various options that are available to advocates of cognitive phenomenology for capturing the experiential contrast between thought and perception, and argues that each of them faces serious challenges.
format	article
author	Tim Bayne Tom McClelland
author_facet	Tim Bayne Tom McClelland
author_sort	Tim Bayne
title	“Finding the Feel”: The Matching Content Challenge to Cognitive Phenomenology
title_short	“Finding the Feel”: The Matching Content Challenge to Cognitive Phenomenology
title_full	“Finding the Feel”: The Matching Content Challenge to Cognitive Phenomenology
title_fullStr	“Finding the Feel”: The Matching Content Challenge to Cognitive Phenomenology
title_full_unstemmed	“Finding the Feel”: The Matching Content Challenge to Cognitive Phenomenology
title_sort	“finding the feel”: the matching content challenge to cognitive phenomenology
publisher	Rosenberg & Sellier
publishDate	2017
url	https://doaj.org/article/1961aabbe103404eb875cdb077384729
work_keys_str_mv	AT timbayne findingthefeelthematchingcontentchallengetocognitivephenomenology AT tommcclelland findingthefeelthematchingcontentchallengetocognitivephenomenology
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“Finding the Feel”: The Matching Content Challenge to Cognitive Phenomenology

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