The Plural Subject Approach to Social Ontology and the Sharing Values Issue

I address the issue of the unity of social ontology despite the extreme variety of social entities: groups, money, promises, governments, laws, etc. Then, I focus on Gilbert’s account of social ontology as an ontology specifically dealing with groups as plural subjects, and face with Gilbert’s conc...

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Autor principal:	Francesca De Vecchi
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN FR IT
Publicado:	Rosenberg & Sellier 2016
Materias:	social ontology plural subject shared values collective values Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/19c0cc4277bf4bffb6a9a50e643de086
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id	oai:doaj.org-article:19c0cc4277bf4bffb6a9a50e643de086
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:19c0cc4277bf4bffb6a9a50e643de0862021-12-02T09:51:19ZThe Plural Subject Approach to Social Ontology and the Sharing Values Issue10.13128/Phe_Mi-181542280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/19c0cc4277bf4bffb6a9a50e643de0862016-04-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7216https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028 I address the issue of the unity of social ontology despite the extreme variety of social entities: groups, money, promises, governments, laws, etc. Then, I focus on Gilbert’s account of social ontology as an ontology specifically dealing with groups as plural subjects, and face with Gilbert’s concept of shared values as values of plural subjects created by joint commitment. I argue that Gilbert’s account of shared values is a cognitivist and extrinsic one: it neglects the specific role of values for the constitution of plural subjects and considers values neither as a necessary nor as a sufficient condition for social unity. I suggest that, unlike Gilbert and the main trend in the contemporary social ontological debate, phenomenology provides an axiology that can allow to account adequately for values and to understand values’ crucial role for social unity. I discuss Scheler’s dividing vs. sharing values thesis and mention Schapp’s collective values thesis. Finally I address the question of the collective feeling value. Francesca De VecchiRosenberg & Sellierarticlesocial ontologyplural subjectshared valuescollective valuesAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 9 (2016)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN FR IT
topic	social ontology plural subject shared values collective values Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
spellingShingle	social ontology plural subject shared values collective values Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 Francesca De Vecchi The Plural Subject Approach to Social Ontology and the Sharing Values Issue
description	I address the issue of the unity of social ontology despite the extreme variety of social entities: groups, money, promises, governments, laws, etc. Then, I focus on Gilbert’s account of social ontology as an ontology specifically dealing with groups as plural subjects, and face with Gilbert’s concept of shared values as values of plural subjects created by joint commitment. I argue that Gilbert’s account of shared values is a cognitivist and extrinsic one: it neglects the specific role of values for the constitution of plural subjects and considers values neither as a necessary nor as a sufficient condition for social unity. I suggest that, unlike Gilbert and the main trend in the contemporary social ontological debate, phenomenology provides an axiology that can allow to account adequately for values and to understand values’ crucial role for social unity. I discuss Scheler’s dividing vs. sharing values thesis and mention Schapp’s collective values thesis. Finally I address the question of the collective feeling value.
format	article
author	Francesca De Vecchi
author_facet	Francesca De Vecchi
author_sort	Francesca De Vecchi
title	The Plural Subject Approach to Social Ontology and the Sharing Values Issue
title_short	The Plural Subject Approach to Social Ontology and the Sharing Values Issue
title_full	The Plural Subject Approach to Social Ontology and the Sharing Values Issue
title_fullStr	The Plural Subject Approach to Social Ontology and the Sharing Values Issue
title_full_unstemmed	The Plural Subject Approach to Social Ontology and the Sharing Values Issue
title_sort	plural subject approach to social ontology and the sharing values issue
publisher	Rosenberg & Sellier
publishDate	2016
url	https://doaj.org/article/19c0cc4277bf4bffb6a9a50e643de086
work_keys_str_mv	AT francescadevecchi thepluralsubjectapproachtosocialontologyandthesharingvaluesissue AT francescadevecchi pluralsubjectapproachtosocialontologyandthesharingvaluesissue
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The Plural Subject Approach to Social Ontology and the Sharing Values Issue

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