Analysis of an evolutionary game of pallet pooling with participation of third-party platform.

Pallet pooling has been widely recognized as an important part of the green supply chain. The development of pallet pooling is an essential component for the transformation and upgrade of the logistics industry in China. Pallet pooling can, however, lead to a conflict over potential benefits among t...

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Autores principales:	Cuiping Liu, Xinchun Li, Quanlong Liu
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Public Library of Science (PLoS) 2021
Materias:	Medicine R Science Q
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/1d203d33ba4f47f2b5d286448c065269
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id	oai:doaj.org-article:1d203d33ba4f47f2b5d286448c065269
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:1d203d33ba4f47f2b5d286448c0652692021-12-02T20:16:37ZAnalysis of an evolutionary game of pallet pooling with participation of third-party platform.1932-620310.1371/journal.pone.0256923https://doaj.org/article/1d203d33ba4f47f2b5d286448c0652692021-01-01T00:00:00Zhttps://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0256923https://doaj.org/toc/1932-6203Pallet pooling has been widely recognized as an important part of the green supply chain. The development of pallet pooling is an essential component for the transformation and upgrade of the logistics industry in China. Pallet pooling can, however, lead to a conflict over potential benefits among the players. One of the main problems of pallet pooling in China is the reasonable benefit allocation mechanism has not been formed. The pallet pooling system (PPS) with participation of the third-party platform (PPSWPTPP) is one of the pilot modes of pallet pooling in China. Based on evolutionary game theory and a penalty mechanism for breach of contract, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of the PPSWPTPP. Eight propositions are set in two basic scenarios regarding whether pallet pooling is adapted to the logistics market to study the stability and dynamic evolution process of the players in the PPSWPTPP. Theoretical and numerical simulation results indicate that these will affect the smooth development of the PPS. The suitable setting of penalties and bonuses, the precise estimation of the pooling benefits, the intention intensity of the players to the pallet pooling, and whether to adapt to the logistics market demand are explored.Cuiping LiuXinchun LiQuanlong LiuPublic Library of Science (PLoS)articleMedicineRScienceQENPLoS ONE, Vol 16, Iss 10, p e0256923 (2021)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Medicine R Science Q
spellingShingle	Medicine R Science Q Cuiping Liu Xinchun Li Quanlong Liu Analysis of an evolutionary game of pallet pooling with participation of third-party platform.
description	Pallet pooling has been widely recognized as an important part of the green supply chain. The development of pallet pooling is an essential component for the transformation and upgrade of the logistics industry in China. Pallet pooling can, however, lead to a conflict over potential benefits among the players. One of the main problems of pallet pooling in China is the reasonable benefit allocation mechanism has not been formed. The pallet pooling system (PPS) with participation of the third-party platform (PPSWPTPP) is one of the pilot modes of pallet pooling in China. Based on evolutionary game theory and a penalty mechanism for breach of contract, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of the PPSWPTPP. Eight propositions are set in two basic scenarios regarding whether pallet pooling is adapted to the logistics market to study the stability and dynamic evolution process of the players in the PPSWPTPP. Theoretical and numerical simulation results indicate that these will affect the smooth development of the PPS. The suitable setting of penalties and bonuses, the precise estimation of the pooling benefits, the intention intensity of the players to the pallet pooling, and whether to adapt to the logistics market demand are explored.
format	article
author	Cuiping Liu Xinchun Li Quanlong Liu
author_facet	Cuiping Liu Xinchun Li Quanlong Liu
author_sort	Cuiping Liu
title	Analysis of an evolutionary game of pallet pooling with participation of third-party platform.
title_short	Analysis of an evolutionary game of pallet pooling with participation of third-party platform.
title_full	Analysis of an evolutionary game of pallet pooling with participation of third-party platform.
title_fullStr	Analysis of an evolutionary game of pallet pooling with participation of third-party platform.
title_full_unstemmed	Analysis of an evolutionary game of pallet pooling with participation of third-party platform.
title_sort	analysis of an evolutionary game of pallet pooling with participation of third-party platform.
publisher	Public Library of Science (PLoS)
publishDate	2021
url	https://doaj.org/article/1d203d33ba4f47f2b5d286448c065269
work_keys_str_mv	AT cuipingliu analysisofanevolutionarygameofpalletpoolingwithparticipationofthirdpartyplatform AT xinchunli analysisofanevolutionarygameofpalletpoolingwithparticipationofthirdpartyplatform AT quanlongliu analysisofanevolutionarygameofpalletpoolingwithparticipationofthirdpartyplatform
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Analysis of an evolutionary game of pallet pooling with participation of third-party platform.

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