Color Relationism and Enactive Ontology
In this paper, I present the enactive theory of color that implies a form of color relationism. I argue that this view constitutes a better alternative to color subjectivism and color objectivism. I liken the enactive view to Husserl’s phenomenology of perception, arguing that both deconstruct the c...
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Rosenberg & Sellier
2018
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oai:doaj.org-article:1ea7abad89e34cd7b4889f1e2a0284282021-12-02T12:19:25ZColor Relationism and Enactive Ontology10.13128/Phe_Mi-236252280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/1ea7abad89e34cd7b4889f1e2a0284282018-09-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7307https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028In this paper, I present the enactive theory of color that implies a form of color relationism. I argue that this view constitutes a better alternative to color subjectivism and color objectivism. I liken the enactive view to Husserl’s phenomenology of perception, arguing that both deconstruct the clear duality of subject and object, which is at the basis of the other theories of color, in order to claim the co-constitution of subject and object in the process of experience. I also extend the enactive and phenomenological account of color to the more general topic of the epistemological and ontological status of sensory qualities (qualia), outlining the fields of enactive phenomenology and enactive ontology.Andrea GiannottaRosenberg & SellierarticlequaliaperceptionenactivismphenomenologyAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 14 (2018) |
institution |
DOAJ |
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DOAJ |
language |
EN FR IT |
topic |
qualia perception enactivism phenomenology Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 |
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qualia perception enactivism phenomenology Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 Andrea Giannotta Color Relationism and Enactive Ontology |
description |
In this paper, I present the enactive theory of color that implies a form of color relationism. I argue that this view constitutes a better alternative to color subjectivism and color objectivism. I liken the enactive view to Husserl’s phenomenology of perception, arguing that both deconstruct the clear duality of subject and object, which is at the basis of the other theories of color, in order to claim the co-constitution of subject and object in the process of experience. I also extend the enactive and phenomenological account of color to the more general topic of the epistemological and ontological status of sensory qualities (qualia), outlining the fields of enactive phenomenology and enactive ontology. |
format |
article |
author |
Andrea Giannotta |
author_facet |
Andrea Giannotta |
author_sort |
Andrea Giannotta |
title |
Color Relationism and Enactive Ontology |
title_short |
Color Relationism and Enactive Ontology |
title_full |
Color Relationism and Enactive Ontology |
title_fullStr |
Color Relationism and Enactive Ontology |
title_full_unstemmed |
Color Relationism and Enactive Ontology |
title_sort |
color relationism and enactive ontology |
publisher |
Rosenberg & Sellier |
publishDate |
2018 |
url |
https://doaj.org/article/1ea7abad89e34cd7b4889f1e2a028428 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT andreagiannotta colorrelationismandenactiveontology |
_version_ |
1718394501749276672 |