Information Leakage and Financing Decisions in a Supply Chain with Corporate Social Responsibility and Supply Uncertainty

This paper investigates information leakage and financing simultaneously in a supply chain (SC) consisting of one capital-constrained supplier and two retailers with private demand-forecast signals. The supplier invests in corporate social responsibility (CSR) events and displays supply uncertainty....

Descripción completa

Guardado en:

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales:	Junjian Wu, Henry Xu
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	MDPI AG 2021
Materias:	supply chain management supply chain financing supply uncertainty information leakage corporate social responsibility competition Environmental effects of industries and plants TD194-195 Renewable energy sources TJ807-830 Environmental sciences GE1-350
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/21535f771fb94b7a897bb9df92ae1ba7
Etiquetas:	Agregar Etiqueta Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

id	oai:doaj.org-article:21535f771fb94b7a897bb9df92ae1ba7
record_format	dspace
spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:21535f771fb94b7a897bb9df92ae1ba72021-11-11T19:36:32ZInformation Leakage and Financing Decisions in a Supply Chain with Corporate Social Responsibility and Supply Uncertainty10.3390/su1321119172071-1050https://doaj.org/article/21535f771fb94b7a897bb9df92ae1ba72021-10-01T00:00:00Zhttps://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/13/21/11917https://doaj.org/toc/2071-1050This paper investigates information leakage and financing simultaneously in a supply chain (SC) consisting of one capital-constrained supplier and two retailers with private demand-forecast signals. The supplier invests in corporate social responsibility (CSR) events and displays supply uncertainty. The supplier decides whether to leak information (<i>L</i>) or not (<i>N</i>). Additionally, the supplier has two financing strategies: bank credit financing (<i>B</i>) and trade credit financing (<i>T</i>). Thus, by combining the supplier’s information leakage and financing decisions, we formulated four possible strategies (i.e., <i>NB</i>, <i>NT</i>, <i>LB</i>, <i>LT</i>) and built a game analysis model to address the interaction of information leakage and financing decisions. We first provide the SC members’ optimal operational decisions (including the order quantity, the wholesale price and CSR effort level) under four strategies. Subsequently, we compare the profits of the suppliers and retailers under four strategies by combining analytical and numerical analysis. Several interesting results were found: (1) the supplier’s optimal wholesale price, CSR effort level, and profit under information leakage were higher than those under no information leakage; (2) the supplier’s financing decisions are dependent on the loan interest rate as low supply uncertainty and low supply correlation motivate the supplier to prefer choosing trade credit financing; and (3) finally, several interesting insights in managing SCs are provided.Junjian WuHenry XuMDPI AGarticlesupply chain managementsupply chain financingsupply uncertaintyinformation leakagecorporate social responsibilitycompetitionEnvironmental effects of industries and plantsTD194-195Renewable energy sourcesTJ807-830Environmental sciencesGE1-350ENSustainability, Vol 13, Iss 11917, p 11917 (2021)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	supply chain management supply chain financing supply uncertainty information leakage corporate social responsibility competition Environmental effects of industries and plants TD194-195 Renewable energy sources TJ807-830 Environmental sciences GE1-350
spellingShingle	supply chain management supply chain financing supply uncertainty information leakage corporate social responsibility competition Environmental effects of industries and plants TD194-195 Renewable energy sources TJ807-830 Environmental sciences GE1-350 Junjian Wu Henry Xu Information Leakage and Financing Decisions in a Supply Chain with Corporate Social Responsibility and Supply Uncertainty
description	This paper investigates information leakage and financing simultaneously in a supply chain (SC) consisting of one capital-constrained supplier and two retailers with private demand-forecast signals. The supplier invests in corporate social responsibility (CSR) events and displays supply uncertainty. The supplier decides whether to leak information (<i>L</i>) or not (<i>N</i>). Additionally, the supplier has two financing strategies: bank credit financing (<i>B</i>) and trade credit financing (<i>T</i>). Thus, by combining the supplier’s information leakage and financing decisions, we formulated four possible strategies (i.e., <i>NB</i>, <i>NT</i>, <i>LB</i>, <i>LT</i>) and built a game analysis model to address the interaction of information leakage and financing decisions. We first provide the SC members’ optimal operational decisions (including the order quantity, the wholesale price and CSR effort level) under four strategies. Subsequently, we compare the profits of the suppliers and retailers under four strategies by combining analytical and numerical analysis. Several interesting results were found: (1) the supplier’s optimal wholesale price, CSR effort level, and profit under information leakage were higher than those under no information leakage; (2) the supplier’s financing decisions are dependent on the loan interest rate as low supply uncertainty and low supply correlation motivate the supplier to prefer choosing trade credit financing; and (3) finally, several interesting insights in managing SCs are provided.
format	article
author	Junjian Wu Henry Xu
author_facet	Junjian Wu Henry Xu
author_sort	Junjian Wu
title	Information Leakage and Financing Decisions in a Supply Chain with Corporate Social Responsibility and Supply Uncertainty
title_short	Information Leakage and Financing Decisions in a Supply Chain with Corporate Social Responsibility and Supply Uncertainty
title_full	Information Leakage and Financing Decisions in a Supply Chain with Corporate Social Responsibility and Supply Uncertainty
title_fullStr	Information Leakage and Financing Decisions in a Supply Chain with Corporate Social Responsibility and Supply Uncertainty
title_full_unstemmed	Information Leakage and Financing Decisions in a Supply Chain with Corporate Social Responsibility and Supply Uncertainty
title_sort	information leakage and financing decisions in a supply chain with corporate social responsibility and supply uncertainty
publisher	MDPI AG
publishDate	2021
url	https://doaj.org/article/21535f771fb94b7a897bb9df92ae1ba7
work_keys_str_mv	AT junjianwu informationleakageandfinancingdecisionsinasupplychainwithcorporatesocialresponsibilityandsupplyuncertainty AT henryxu informationleakageandfinancingdecisionsinasupplychainwithcorporatesocialresponsibilityandsupplyuncertainty
_version_	1718431453213097984

Information Leakage and Financing Decisions in a Supply Chain with Corporate Social Responsibility and Supply Uncertainty

Ejemplares similares