Representationalism and Ambiguous Figures

The phenomenon of ambiguous figures raises difficulties for the theories of the content of our visual experience that hold that its phenomenal character is identical to its representational content and wholly nonconceptual. This phenomenon seems to show that there can be a difference in the phenome...

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Autor principal: Arianna Uggé
Formato: article
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FR
IT
Publicado: Rosenberg & Sellier 2016
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Acceso en línea:https://doaj.org/article/237475f5edcb47bc81ea93a525a04535
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spelling oai:doaj.org-article:237475f5edcb47bc81ea93a525a045352021-12-02T12:14:28ZRepresentationalism and Ambiguous Figures10.13128/Phe_Mi-195982280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/237475f5edcb47bc81ea93a525a045352016-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7117https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028 The phenomenon of ambiguous figures raises difficulties for the theories of the content of our visual experience that hold that its phenomenal character is identical to its representational content and wholly nonconceptual. This phenomenon seems to show that there can be a difference in the phenomenal character of two visual experiences, without a difference in their representational nonconceptual content. Firstly, I shall try to illustrate that these “representationalist” theories cannot provide a compelling explanation for the phenomenon of ambiguous figures. Secondly, I will present an account of it grounded on Peacocke’s “dual nonconceptual content” view. The distinction he draws between two levels of nonconceptual content can be used to explain the phenomenon without abandoning the thesis that the phenomenal character of our visual experience is a representational wholly nonconceptual content. Arianna UggéRosenberg & Sellierarticlerepresentationalismambiguous figuresvisual experienceAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 4 (2016)
institution DOAJ
collection DOAJ
language EN
FR
IT
topic representationalism
ambiguous figures
visual experience
Aesthetics
BH1-301
Ethics
BJ1-1725
spellingShingle representationalism
ambiguous figures
visual experience
Aesthetics
BH1-301
Ethics
BJ1-1725
Arianna Uggé
Representationalism and Ambiguous Figures
description The phenomenon of ambiguous figures raises difficulties for the theories of the content of our visual experience that hold that its phenomenal character is identical to its representational content and wholly nonconceptual. This phenomenon seems to show that there can be a difference in the phenomenal character of two visual experiences, without a difference in their representational nonconceptual content. Firstly, I shall try to illustrate that these “representationalist” theories cannot provide a compelling explanation for the phenomenon of ambiguous figures. Secondly, I will present an account of it grounded on Peacocke’s “dual nonconceptual content” view. The distinction he draws between two levels of nonconceptual content can be used to explain the phenomenon without abandoning the thesis that the phenomenal character of our visual experience is a representational wholly nonconceptual content.
format article
author Arianna Uggé
author_facet Arianna Uggé
author_sort Arianna Uggé
title Representationalism and Ambiguous Figures
title_short Representationalism and Ambiguous Figures
title_full Representationalism and Ambiguous Figures
title_fullStr Representationalism and Ambiguous Figures
title_full_unstemmed Representationalism and Ambiguous Figures
title_sort representationalism and ambiguous figures
publisher Rosenberg & Sellier
publishDate 2016
url https://doaj.org/article/237475f5edcb47bc81ea93a525a04535
work_keys_str_mv AT ariannaugge representationalismandambiguousfigures
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