Reasons for Resisting Darwinism, and Why They Should Not Be Credited
Plantinga argues that Darwinism implies that we cannot help adopting our apparently reflective beliefs, and that this is a reason for rejecting Darwinism. I argue that similar arguments apparently apply to the beliefs crucial to deliberation, meaningful work, meaningful relationships, meaningful com...
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| Formato: | article |
| Lenguaje: | EN |
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De Gruyter
2021
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| Acceso en línea: | https://doaj.org/article/2438bd9536294d9d821be74c1881c7fe |
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| Sumario: | Plantinga argues that Darwinism implies that we cannot help adopting our apparently reflective beliefs, and that this is a reason for rejecting Darwinism. I argue that similar arguments apparently apply to the beliefs crucial to deliberation, meaningful work, meaningful relationships, meaningful communication and creativity. But these arguments apply to deterministic versions of Darwinism only. Cogent non-deterministic versions have been propounded by Popper, Rose, Lewontin, Ward and Miller (those of Ward and Miller being theistic versions). These versions are presented, as is Midgley’s account of how evolution has endowed us with a mix of desires that prepare the way for choice. Plantinga-type arguments pose no problem for such non-deterministic Darwinisms. |
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