Invisible Trojan-horse attack

Abstract We demonstrate the experimental feasibility of a Trojan-horse attack that remains nearly invisible to the single-photon detectors employed in practical quantum key distribution (QKD) systems, such as Clavis2 from ID Quantique. We perform a detailed numerical comparison of the attack perform...

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Autores principales:	Shihan Sajeed, Carter Minshull, Nitin Jain, Vadim Makarov
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Nature Portfolio 2017
Materias:	Medicine R Science Q
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/24b1b175064541328a6c4967e78d5d01
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:24b1b175064541328a6c4967e78d5d012021-12-02T15:06:08ZInvisible Trojan-horse attack10.1038/s41598-017-08279-12045-2322https://doaj.org/article/24b1b175064541328a6c4967e78d5d012017-08-01T00:00:00Zhttps://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-017-08279-1https://doaj.org/toc/2045-2322Abstract We demonstrate the experimental feasibility of a Trojan-horse attack that remains nearly invisible to the single-photon detectors employed in practical quantum key distribution (QKD) systems, such as Clavis2 from ID Quantique. We perform a detailed numerical comparison of the attack performance against Scarani-Ac´ın-Ribordy-Gisin (SARG04) QKD protocol at 1924 nm versus that at 1536 nm. The attack strategy was proposed earlier but found to be unsuccessful at the latter wavelength, as reported in N. Jain et al., New J. Phys. 16, 123030 (2014). However at 1924 nm, we show experimentally that the noise response of the detectors to bright pulses is greatly reduced, and show by modeling that the same attack will succeed. The invisible nature of the attack poses a threat to the security of practical QKD if proper countermeasures are not adopted.Shihan SajeedCarter MinshullNitin JainVadim MakarovNature PortfolioarticleMedicineRScienceQENScientific Reports, Vol 7, Iss 1, Pp 1-7 (2017)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Medicine R Science Q
spellingShingle	Medicine R Science Q Shihan Sajeed Carter Minshull Nitin Jain Vadim Makarov Invisible Trojan-horse attack
description	Abstract We demonstrate the experimental feasibility of a Trojan-horse attack that remains nearly invisible to the single-photon detectors employed in practical quantum key distribution (QKD) systems, such as Clavis2 from ID Quantique. We perform a detailed numerical comparison of the attack performance against Scarani-Ac´ın-Ribordy-Gisin (SARG04) QKD protocol at 1924 nm versus that at 1536 nm. The attack strategy was proposed earlier but found to be unsuccessful at the latter wavelength, as reported in N. Jain et al., New J. Phys. 16, 123030 (2014). However at 1924 nm, we show experimentally that the noise response of the detectors to bright pulses is greatly reduced, and show by modeling that the same attack will succeed. The invisible nature of the attack poses a threat to the security of practical QKD if proper countermeasures are not adopted.
format	article
author	Shihan Sajeed Carter Minshull Nitin Jain Vadim Makarov
author_facet	Shihan Sajeed Carter Minshull Nitin Jain Vadim Makarov
author_sort	Shihan Sajeed
title	Invisible Trojan-horse attack
title_short	Invisible Trojan-horse attack
title_full	Invisible Trojan-horse attack
title_fullStr	Invisible Trojan-horse attack
title_full_unstemmed	Invisible Trojan-horse attack
title_sort	invisible trojan-horse attack
publisher	Nature Portfolio
publishDate	2017
url	https://doaj.org/article/24b1b175064541328a6c4967e78d5d01
work_keys_str_mv	AT shihansajeed invisibletrojanhorseattack AT carterminshull invisibletrojanhorseattack AT nitinjain invisibletrojanhorseattack AT vadimmakarov invisibletrojanhorseattack
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Invisible Trojan-horse attack

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