How Does the R&D Cooperation Path of Supply and Demand Network Enterprises Evolve?

To explore the complexity and uncertainty of R&D cooperation in supply and demand network (SDN) enterprises, this study used the evolutionary game theory and the duplicate dynamic equation to construct the R&D cooperation strategy selection model. Based on the perspective of kn...

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Autores principales:	Jianjia He, Jusheng Liu, Zhiping Qiu, Ngayua Esther Nanzayi, Min Zhang
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	IEEE 2021
Materias:	Supply and demand network knowledge spillover R&D cooperation evolutionary game theory business management Electrical engineering. Electronics. Nuclear engineering TK1-9971
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/2527825a29cb4d7c88b0f8baf4161963
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:2527825a29cb4d7c88b0f8baf41619632021-12-03T00:00:41ZHow Does the R&D Cooperation Path of Supply and Demand Network Enterprises Evolve?2169-353610.1109/ACCESS.2021.3128647https://doaj.org/article/2527825a29cb4d7c88b0f8baf41619632021-01-01T00:00:00Zhttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9617603/https://doaj.org/toc/2169-3536To explore the complexity and uncertainty of R&D cooperation in supply and demand network (SDN) enterprises, this study used the evolutionary game theory and the duplicate dynamic equation to construct the R&D cooperation strategy selection model. Based on the perspective of knowledge spillover, the model investigated the influence of knowledge spillover, government reward, government penalty, cooperative cost, and R&D cooperation risk in the cooperation of SDN enterprises. Next, this study analyzed the stability and the system evolution path of the model. Finally, it used numerical simulation to vary the rationality of the model. Based on this research, there are some conclusions can be obtained: Firstly, the evolution of R&D cooperation strategy for SDN enterprises may eventually stabilize at cooperation or selfishness strategy under different situations. As for which strategy is ultimately stable, it is closely related to the construction of the initial payment matrix and the selection of initial parameters. Secondly, there are two stable states in the game system: cooperation and selfishness. If one party chooses cooperation and the other party chooses selfishness, the system will not be stable. Thirdly, knowledge spillover degree, government reward, government penalty, government penalty, cooperation cost, and cooperation risk are important factors that can influence the cooperation evolution of SDN enerprises. Fourth, under certain situations, if knowledge spillover degree, government reward, and government penalty increase, cooperation cost and cooperation risk decrease, the R&D cooperation in SDN enterprises will be improved. Related implications and suggestions are finally proposed, which can offer some valuable guidance for the development of SDN enterprises.Jianjia HeJusheng LiuZhiping QiuNgayua Esther NanzayiMin ZhangIEEEarticleSupply and demand networkknowledge spilloverR&D cooperationevolutionary game theorybusiness managementElectrical engineering. Electronics. Nuclear engineeringTK1-9971ENIEEE Access, Vol 9, Pp 157889-157901 (2021)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Supply and demand network knowledge spillover R&D cooperation evolutionary game theory business management Electrical engineering. Electronics. Nuclear engineering TK1-9971
spellingShingle	Supply and demand network knowledge spillover R&D cooperation evolutionary game theory business management Electrical engineering. Electronics. Nuclear engineering TK1-9971 Jianjia He Jusheng Liu Zhiping Qiu Ngayua Esther Nanzayi Min Zhang How Does the R&D Cooperation Path of Supply and Demand Network Enterprises Evolve?
description	To explore the complexity and uncertainty of R&D cooperation in supply and demand network (SDN) enterprises, this study used the evolutionary game theory and the duplicate dynamic equation to construct the R&D cooperation strategy selection model. Based on the perspective of knowledge spillover, the model investigated the influence of knowledge spillover, government reward, government penalty, cooperative cost, and R&D cooperation risk in the cooperation of SDN enterprises. Next, this study analyzed the stability and the system evolution path of the model. Finally, it used numerical simulation to vary the rationality of the model. Based on this research, there are some conclusions can be obtained: Firstly, the evolution of R&D cooperation strategy for SDN enterprises may eventually stabilize at cooperation or selfishness strategy under different situations. As for which strategy is ultimately stable, it is closely related to the construction of the initial payment matrix and the selection of initial parameters. Secondly, there are two stable states in the game system: cooperation and selfishness. If one party chooses cooperation and the other party chooses selfishness, the system will not be stable. Thirdly, knowledge spillover degree, government reward, government penalty, government penalty, cooperation cost, and cooperation risk are important factors that can influence the cooperation evolution of SDN enerprises. Fourth, under certain situations, if knowledge spillover degree, government reward, and government penalty increase, cooperation cost and cooperation risk decrease, the R&D cooperation in SDN enterprises will be improved. Related implications and suggestions are finally proposed, which can offer some valuable guidance for the development of SDN enterprises.
format	article
author	Jianjia He Jusheng Liu Zhiping Qiu Ngayua Esther Nanzayi Min Zhang
author_facet	Jianjia He Jusheng Liu Zhiping Qiu Ngayua Esther Nanzayi Min Zhang
author_sort	Jianjia He
title	How Does the R&D Cooperation Path of Supply and Demand Network Enterprises Evolve?
title_short	How Does the R&D Cooperation Path of Supply and Demand Network Enterprises Evolve?
title_full	How Does the R&D Cooperation Path of Supply and Demand Network Enterprises Evolve?
title_fullStr	How Does the R&D Cooperation Path of Supply and Demand Network Enterprises Evolve?
title_full_unstemmed	How Does the R&D Cooperation Path of Supply and Demand Network Enterprises Evolve?
title_sort	how does the r&d cooperation path of supply and demand network enterprises evolve?
publisher	IEEE
publishDate	2021
url	https://doaj.org/article/2527825a29cb4d7c88b0f8baf4161963
work_keys_str_mv	AT jianjiahe howdoestherx0026dcooperationpathofsupplyanddemandnetworkenterprisesevolve AT jushengliu howdoestherx0026dcooperationpathofsupplyanddemandnetworkenterprisesevolve AT zhipingqiu howdoestherx0026dcooperationpathofsupplyanddemandnetworkenterprisesevolve AT ngayuaesthernanzayi howdoestherx0026dcooperationpathofsupplyanddemandnetworkenterprisesevolve AT minzhang howdoestherx0026dcooperationpathofsupplyanddemandnetworkenterprisesevolve
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How Does the R&#x0026;D Cooperation Path of Supply and Demand Network Enterprises Evolve?

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