The Split in Boko Haram and Its Impact for the Lake Chad Basin Region

The Islamist group Boko Haram (BH) was founded in the early 2000s and in less than two decades has transformed from a “Nigerian” movement into a regional one. Tactical, strategic and ideological differences between the leaders of BH have repeatedly led to its splits into separate factions; the most...

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Autores principales: T. S. Denisova, S. V. Kostelyanets
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RU
Publicado: Ассоциация независимых экспертов «Центр изучения кризисного общества» (in English: Association for independent experts “Center for Crisis Society Studies”) 2021
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Acceso en línea:https://doaj.org/article/26342e21816b4db3ab159cce26341729
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spelling oai:doaj.org-article:26342e21816b4db3ab159cce263417292021-11-07T14:45:05ZThe Split in Boko Haram and Its Impact for the Lake Chad Basin Region2542-02402587-932410.23932/2542-0240-2021-14-2-12https://doaj.org/article/26342e21816b4db3ab159cce263417292021-04-01T00:00:00Zhttps://www.ogt-journal.com/jour/article/view/762https://doaj.org/toc/2542-0240https://doaj.org/toc/2587-9324The Islamist group Boko Haram (BH) was founded in the early 2000s and in less than two decades has transformed from a “Nigerian” movement into a regional one. Tactical, strategic and ideological differences between the leaders of BH have repeatedly led to its splits into separate factions; the most serious occurred in 2016, when the group split into the Islamic State in West Africa Province and Jamaatu Ahl-is-Sunna Lidda’Awati Wal-Jihad, the latter being still referred to as “Boko Haram” for convenience.The present paper examines the reasons for the splits in BH, the goals and military tactics of the two factions, and the prospects for the development of the security situation in the region of the Lake Chad basin (LCB), where armed conflict is fueled by large-scale poverty, socio-economic and political marginalization, and ineffectiveness of local authorities against the background of intertribal tensions and massive migration.The LCB has now become a huge human reservoir for jihadist recruitment. The situation in the region is further complicated by the fact that a significant portion of the population supports the Islamists, while the majority of locals are targeted by them and seek to leave their homes.The authors note that the division of BH into separate factions has made it more difficult for the LCB armed forces to conduct anti-terrorist operations, and for the LCB governments to negotiate cease fires or retrieve hostages, although, simultaneously, the split has led to a certain decline in the level of violence and to the weakening of the influence of the Islamists on the socio-economic development in the region.T. S. DenisovaS. V. KostelyanetsАссоциация независимых экспертов «Центр изучения кризисного общества» (in English: Association for independent experts “Center for Crisis Society Studies”)articleafricaboko haramarmed conflictterrorismlake chad basinal qaedadaeshInternational relationsJZ2-6530ENRUКонтуры глобальных трансформаций: политика, экономика, право, Vol 14, Iss 2, Pp 214-230 (2021)
institution DOAJ
collection DOAJ
language EN
RU
topic africa
boko haram
armed conflict
terrorism
lake chad basin
al qaeda
daesh
International relations
JZ2-6530
spellingShingle africa
boko haram
armed conflict
terrorism
lake chad basin
al qaeda
daesh
International relations
JZ2-6530
T. S. Denisova
S. V. Kostelyanets
The Split in Boko Haram and Its Impact for the Lake Chad Basin Region
description The Islamist group Boko Haram (BH) was founded in the early 2000s and in less than two decades has transformed from a “Nigerian” movement into a regional one. Tactical, strategic and ideological differences between the leaders of BH have repeatedly led to its splits into separate factions; the most serious occurred in 2016, when the group split into the Islamic State in West Africa Province and Jamaatu Ahl-is-Sunna Lidda’Awati Wal-Jihad, the latter being still referred to as “Boko Haram” for convenience.The present paper examines the reasons for the splits in BH, the goals and military tactics of the two factions, and the prospects for the development of the security situation in the region of the Lake Chad basin (LCB), where armed conflict is fueled by large-scale poverty, socio-economic and political marginalization, and ineffectiveness of local authorities against the background of intertribal tensions and massive migration.The LCB has now become a huge human reservoir for jihadist recruitment. The situation in the region is further complicated by the fact that a significant portion of the population supports the Islamists, while the majority of locals are targeted by them and seek to leave their homes.The authors note that the division of BH into separate factions has made it more difficult for the LCB armed forces to conduct anti-terrorist operations, and for the LCB governments to negotiate cease fires or retrieve hostages, although, simultaneously, the split has led to a certain decline in the level of violence and to the weakening of the influence of the Islamists on the socio-economic development in the region.
format article
author T. S. Denisova
S. V. Kostelyanets
author_facet T. S. Denisova
S. V. Kostelyanets
author_sort T. S. Denisova
title The Split in Boko Haram and Its Impact for the Lake Chad Basin Region
title_short The Split in Boko Haram and Its Impact for the Lake Chad Basin Region
title_full The Split in Boko Haram and Its Impact for the Lake Chad Basin Region
title_fullStr The Split in Boko Haram and Its Impact for the Lake Chad Basin Region
title_full_unstemmed The Split in Boko Haram and Its Impact for the Lake Chad Basin Region
title_sort split in boko haram and its impact for the lake chad basin region
publisher Ассоциация независимых экспертов «Центр изучения кризисного общества» (in English: Association for independent experts “Center for Crisis Society Studies”)
publishDate 2021
url https://doaj.org/article/26342e21816b4db3ab159cce26341729
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