Conscious Intentionality in Perception, Imagination, and Cognition

Participants in the cognitive phenomenology debate have proceeded by (a) proposing a bifurcation of theoretical options into inflationary and non-inflationary theories, and then (b) providing arguments for/against one of these theories. I suggest that this method has failed to illuminate the common...

Descripción completa

Guardado en:

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal:	Philip Woodward
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN FR IT
Publicado:	Rosenberg & Sellier 2017
Materias:	cognitive phenomenology phenomenal intentionality perception imagination Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/27da92fb834344aa98b4c77e1d43f06b
Etiquetas:	Agregar Etiqueta Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

id	oai:doaj.org-article:27da92fb834344aa98b4c77e1d43f06b
record_format	dspace
spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:27da92fb834344aa98b4c77e1d43f06b2021-12-02T12:01:57ZConscious Intentionality in Perception, Imagination, and Cognition10.13128/Phe_Mi-200972280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/27da92fb834344aa98b4c77e1d43f06b2017-01-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7234https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028 Participants in the cognitive phenomenology debate have proceeded by (a) proposing a bifurcation of theoretical options into inflationary and non-inflationary theories, and then (b) providing arguments for/against one of these theories. I suggest that this method has failed to illuminate the commonalities and differences among conscious intentional states of different types, in the absence of a theory of the structure of these states. I propose such a theory. In perception, phenomenal-intentional properties combine with somatosensory properties to form P-I property clusters that serve as phenomenal modes of presentations of particulars. In imagination, somatosensory properties are replaced with phenomenal-intentional properties whose intentional objects are somatosensory properties, thus resulting in imaginative facsimiles of perceptual P-I property clusters. Such structures can then be used as phenomenal prototypes that pick out individuals and kinds. Sets of such prototypes constitute a subject’s conception of individuals and kinds. Combined with a few additional elements, these imaginative P-I property clusters serve as the building-blocks of conscious cognitive states. Different ways of carving up theoretical space classify my theory either as inflationary or as non-inflationary. I conclude that the theory is anti-inflationary in letter but inflationary in spirit. Philip WoodwardRosenberg & Sellierarticlecognitive phenomenologyphenomenal intentionalityperceptionimaginationAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 10 (2017)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN FR IT
topic	cognitive phenomenology phenomenal intentionality perception imagination Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
spellingShingle	cognitive phenomenology phenomenal intentionality perception imagination Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 Philip Woodward Conscious Intentionality in Perception, Imagination, and Cognition
description	Participants in the cognitive phenomenology debate have proceeded by (a) proposing a bifurcation of theoretical options into inflationary and non-inflationary theories, and then (b) providing arguments for/against one of these theories. I suggest that this method has failed to illuminate the commonalities and differences among conscious intentional states of different types, in the absence of a theory of the structure of these states. I propose such a theory. In perception, phenomenal-intentional properties combine with somatosensory properties to form P-I property clusters that serve as phenomenal modes of presentations of particulars. In imagination, somatosensory properties are replaced with phenomenal-intentional properties whose intentional objects are somatosensory properties, thus resulting in imaginative facsimiles of perceptual P-I property clusters. Such structures can then be used as phenomenal prototypes that pick out individuals and kinds. Sets of such prototypes constitute a subject’s conception of individuals and kinds. Combined with a few additional elements, these imaginative P-I property clusters serve as the building-blocks of conscious cognitive states. Different ways of carving up theoretical space classify my theory either as inflationary or as non-inflationary. I conclude that the theory is anti-inflationary in letter but inflationary in spirit.
format	article
author	Philip Woodward
author_facet	Philip Woodward
author_sort	Philip Woodward
title	Conscious Intentionality in Perception, Imagination, and Cognition
title_short	Conscious Intentionality in Perception, Imagination, and Cognition
title_full	Conscious Intentionality in Perception, Imagination, and Cognition
title_fullStr	Conscious Intentionality in Perception, Imagination, and Cognition
title_full_unstemmed	Conscious Intentionality in Perception, Imagination, and Cognition
title_sort	conscious intentionality in perception, imagination, and cognition
publisher	Rosenberg & Sellier
publishDate	2017
url	https://doaj.org/article/27da92fb834344aa98b4c77e1d43f06b
work_keys_str_mv	AT philipwoodward consciousintentionalityinperceptionimaginationandcognition
_version_	1718394737825677312

Conscious Intentionality in Perception, Imagination, and Cognition

Ejemplares similares