Conscious Intentionality in Perception, Imagination, and Cognition
Participants in the cognitive phenomenology debate have proceeded by (a) proposing a bifurcation of theoretical options into inflationary and non-inflationary theories, and then (b) providing arguments for/against one of these theories. I suggest that this method has failed to illuminate the common...
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Autor principal: | Philip Woodward |
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Formato: | article |
Lenguaje: | EN FR IT |
Publicado: |
Rosenberg & Sellier
2017
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://doaj.org/article/27da92fb834344aa98b4c77e1d43f06b |
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